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Draft	7/6/15	ALF	
Silent	Tax	Changes:	The	Political	Economy	of	Indexing	for	Inflation	
By	Alan	L.	Feld*								
	
Abstract	
	
The	federal	income	tax	adjusts	many	but	not	all	of	its	dollar	components	
automatically	to	account	for	inflation.		In	this	article	I	analyze	the	benefits	and	
burdens	this	process	confers	on	some	taxpayers	and	the	political	logic	behind	them.		
I	discuss	the	choice	of	the	proper	index	for	making	the	adjustments,	as	well	as	the	
effects	of	the	failure	to	adjust	specific	dollar	amounts.		I	conclude	that	some	
adjustments	have	become	overly	generous,	while	unadjusted	provisions	suffer	slow	
repeal,	sometimes	intentionally.			Indexation	thus	can	have	the	effect	of	tax	
legislation	by	stealth.	
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A	legal	rule,	no	matter	how	neutral	in	form,	creates	winners	and	losers.		To	
take	a	sports	analogy,	a	professional	basketball	hoop	sits	ten	feet	above	the	ground,	
a	neutral	rule	in	form.			Now	substitute	a	different	neutral	rule:		imagine	the	game	of	
basketball	with	the	hoop	at	a	height	of	five	feet	or	twenty	feet.			Under	a	five‐foot	
rule,	players	of	average	height	might	have	a	more	prominent	role	in	the	game,	while	
under	a	twenty‐foot	rule	layups	would	become	more	difficult	and	shooters	who	are	
more	accurate	from	outside	might	be	in	greater	demand.		Exceptions	to	a	rule	create	
even	further	disparate	effects.		Imagine	for	example	a	rule	that	the	hoop	must	be	
lowered	when	shorter	players	take	foul	shots.	
This	paper	examines	the	disparate	effects	of	a	rule	employed	in	the	federal	
income	tax,	indexation	of	dollar	amounts	to	take	account	of	inflation.			Inflation	
reduces	the	buying	power	of	a	fixed	dollar	amount.		Accordingly,	inflation	changes	
the	impact	of	the	federal	income	tax	whenever	the	Internal	Revenue	Code	(the	
“Code”)	employs	a	fixed	dollar	amount.1		The	rate	structure	for	individuals	provides	
an	obvious	example.		The	Code	calculates	the	amount	of	federal	income	tax	owed	by	
applying	to	a	defined	base,	taxable	income,	a	series	of	rates,	divided	into	dollar‐
denominated	brackets,.		The	rates	increase	with	income.2		When	income	rises	to	the	
level	of	a	new	bracket,	any	additional	income	incurs	tax	at	the	higher	rate.		If	a	
person’s	income	rises	at	the	same	rate	as	that	of	inflation	and	thus	maintains	the	
same	before‐tax	buying	power,	but	those	brackets	remain	unadjusted,	the	
proportion	of	income	the	individual	must	pay	in	tax	generally	increases.		Inflation	
thus	can	cause	an	increase	in	the	share	of	real	income	subject	to	tax.		The	aggregate	
effect	on	revenue	can	be	substantial.		Estimates	in	the	1970s,	a	period	of	unusually	
severe	inflation	in	the	United	States,	put	the	rate	of	increase	in	tax	revenue	at	15	‐	
16%	for	every	10%	of	inflation.3			
To	correct	for	this	effect,	the	Code	currently	makes	automatic	annual	
inflation	adjustments	to	the	dollar	brackets	in	the	rate	table,	based	on	changes	in	a	
consumer	price	index	(“CPI”).	4		The	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(BLS)	calculates	a	
number	of	CPIs.		The	Code	generally	makes	its	adjustments	using	the	CPI	for	all‐
urban	consumers	(“CPI‐u”).5	Like	any	rule,	the	automatic	inflation	adjustments	to	
the	income	tax	create	winners	and	losers.			
																																																								
1	Inflation	does	not	alter	the	value	of	amounts	expressed	as	percentages	or	fractions.	
2	I.R.C.		§1.	
3	HENRY	J.	AARON,	INFLATION	AND	THE	INCOME	TAX	66	AM.	ECON.	REV.	193,	195	
(1976).  
	
4	I.R.C.	§	1(f)	(2012)	(cost	of	living	adjustments	is	based	on	the	Consumer	Price	
Index	for	urban	consumers)	
5	Certain	business	credits	use	a	GNP	implicit	price	deflator	to	make	adjustment,	e.g.	
section	43(b)(3).	
		Social	security	inflation	adjustments,	both	for	calculation	of	benefits	and	for	the	cap	
on	earned	income	subject	to	tax,	use	a	different	index,	the	CPI	for	urban	wage	
earners	and	clerical	workers	(“CPI‐w”),	42	U.S.C.	415(i).	
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This	paper	explores	the	politics	and	distributional	effects	of	those	
adjustments.		Part	I	provides	a	short	introduction.		Part	II	considers	the	positive	and	
negative	effect	of	Code	provisions	that	adjust	automatically	for	inflation.		Part	III	
provides	several	examples	of	tax	provisions	that	do	not	adjust	the	dollar	amounts	
for	inflation	and	analyzes	the	political	reasoning	related	to	the	absence	of	the	
adjustment.		Part	IV	provides	a	brief	conclusion.	
	
I. Introduction	
	 Inflation	reduces	the	real	value	of	money.		Private	parties	often	adjust	their	
transactions	to	take	account	of	this	effect.		As	an	example,	if	a	worker	receives	the	
same	dollar	wage	after	a	period	of	inflation,	the	worker’s	buying	power	declines.	If	
the	worker	instead	receives	wage	increases	equal	to	the	rate	of	inflation,	the	worker	
gets	more	dollars	but	maintains	the	same	buying	power.		
	 The	Code	contains	many	fixed	dollar	amounts.		As	inflation	reduces	the	
buying	power	of	those	amounts,	it	increases	the	burden	of	taxation	and	
redistributes	it.6		Congress	could	deal	with	the	effects	of	inflation	in	one	of	four	ways.		
It	could	do	nothing;	it	could	adjust	dollar	amounts	periodically	through	legislation;	it	
could	require	automatic	adjustments,	using	a	specified	index	of	inflation;	or	it	could	
provide	a	substitute	for	the	effects	of	inflation.7		Congress	has	pursued	all	of	these	
methods	at	various	times.		Each	will	have	different	effects	on	the	distribution	of	the	
tax	burden.		If	Congress	refrained	from	taking	action,	inflation	would	produce	a	
gradual	increase	in	total	tax	revenue	and	alter	the	relative	distribution	of	the	tax	
incidence.8	When	Congress	provides	for	automatic	adjustments	in	all	elements	of	
the	tax	structure,	it	maintains	the	previously	existing	allocation	of	the	tax	burden.		In	
the	absence	of	uniform	automatic	adjustments,	periodic	changes	instead	create	
opportunities	for	shifting	portions	of	the	tax	burden	among	different	groups	and	for	
changing	the	amount	of	revenue	produced.	9		
	
Any	change	in	a	tax	provision	affects	one	or	more	groups,	either	beneficially	
or	adversely.			Even	an	apparently	technical	adjustment,	correction	for	inflation,	has	
this	effect	and	as	a	consequence	can	generate	political	opposition.			The	most	recent	
political	dustup	concerned	a	proposal	to	substitute	a	more	accurate	measure	of	
inflation	for	the	CPI‐u	in	the	income	tax	and	for	the	CPI‐w	as	applied	to	social	
security.		Economists	have	criticized	the	CPI‐u	as	a	flawed	measure	of	the	cost	of	
																																																								
6	DONALD W. KIEFER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 83-115, THE 
EFFECTS OF INDEXATION ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM A 
SIMULATION RECORD, 15-22 (1983).	
7	See generally, id. at 23-25 (discussion of policy 
implications of the various approaches).	
8	See discussion infra p. 12.	 
9	See KIEFER supra note 6 at 22. 
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living.10		One	significant	flaw	consists	in	its	failure	to	take	full	account	of	changes	in	
consumer	behavior	in	response	to	inflationary	price	changes.	11	To	reflect	these	
changes	more	accurately,	the	BLS	developed	an	alternative	index	called	the	chained	
CPI	(“c‐CPI”).12	Prominent	economists	have	advocated	substituting	the	c‐CPI	for	the	
CPI‐u	for	at	least	a	decade	and	a	half.	13	The	Bowles‐Simpson	Commission	in	2010	
had	recommended	the	change,	calling	it	a	technical	improvement.14		The	President’s	
2014	budget	proposed	to	substitute	the	c‐CPI	for	the	CPI‐u	and	CPI‐w	in	making	
income	tax	and	social	security	inflation	adjustments.15		The	widely	discussed	2014	
																																																								
10	See	Jerry Hausmann, Sources of Bias & Solutions to Bias in 
the Consumer Price Index, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2003). 
(addressing failure of CPI to account for substitution 
bias); 
 
Michael J. Boskin, Causes and Consequences of Bias in the 
Consumer Price Index as a Measure of the Cost of Living, 33 
ATLANTIC ECON. J. 1(2005); 
 
ADVISORY COMM’N TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 104th CONG., 
FINAL REPORT TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (aka “The Boskin 
Commission Report”) (Comm. Print 1996)(Recommendation # 3 
recommending the development of a Cost of Living Index that 
accounts for substitution bias). 
See	also	JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32293, THE 
CHAINED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: WHAT IS IT AND WOULD IT BE 
APPROPRIATE FOR COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS? (2013) 
	
11	ADVISORY COMM’N TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 104th 
CONG., FINAL REPORT TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (aka “The 
Boskin Commission Report”) 15-16 (Comm. Print 1996)	
12	Note on a New, Supplemental Index of Consumer Price Change, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpisuptn.htm (last updated Apr. 26, 
2011). 
average rate of inflation for CPI-U & c-CPI: 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.t05.htm 
	
13	See Boskin Commission Report, supra note 7. 
	
14	NAT’L COMM. ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, The Moment 
of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform, 51-52, (Dec. 2010). 
	
15OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, 46  
(2013). 
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tax	reform	proposal	made	by	Representative	David	Camp,	then	Chairman	of	the	
House	Ways	and	Means	Committee,	included	a	shift	to	the	c‐CPI.16	
	
	But	changing	the	measure	of	inflation	produces	winners	and	losers.		For	its	
economist	proponents,	the	virtue	of	the	chained	CPI	lies	in	its	more	accurate	
reflection	of	the	change	in	the	cost	of	living	caused	by	inflation.		The	political	
reaction	to	the	proposed	use	of	the	c‐CPI	takes	the	projected	impact	on	particular	
groups	into	account.		President	Obama’s	budget	proposal	for	fiscal	year	2014	to	use	
c‐CPI	to	make	the	inflation	adjustments	,17		provoked	a	heated	reaction	from	social	
security	advocates.18		They	opposed	the	change	because	the	new	method	would	
produce	smaller	inflation	adjustments	and	therefore	smaller	annual	increases	in	
social	security	benefits.		The	effect	of	the	proposed	change	on	the	income	tax	
garnered	a	more	muted	reaction,	however,	notwithstanding	that	smaller	
adjustments	under	the	proposal	would	lead	to	cumulatively	larger	increases	in	tax	
revenues.19		The	critics’	reaction	achieved	their	desired	result.		The	President’s	2015	
budget	dropped	the	proposal	to	substitute	the	c‐CPI.	20		
Had	Congress	adopted	the	proposal,	it	could	have	produced	a	fiscal	double	
benefit.		As	the	critics	understood,	the	substitution	of	c‐CPI	for	CPI‐w	for	social	
security	purposes,	results	in	smaller	annual	benefit	increases.		As	applied	to	the	
income	tax,	the	substitution	of	c‐CPI	for	CPI‐u	produces	smaller	adjustments	to	the	
rate	brackets.		The	smaller	adjustments	result	in	higher	tax	burdens	than	under	the	
																																																																																																																																																																					
	
16	Discussion	draft	of	the	Chairman	of	the	House	Committee	on	Ways	and	Mean	to	
Reform	the	Internal	Revenue	Code,	Section	1001	(2014),	available	at	
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory	text	tax	reform	act	of	
2014	discussion	draft	0226.pdf..	
	
17	OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 11, at 46. 
	
18See	Gary	Koenig	&	Mikki	Waid,	AARP	Public	Policy	Institute,	Proposed	Changes	to	
Social	Security’s	Cost‐of‐Living	Adjustment:	What	Would	They	Mean	for	Beneficiaries?,	
INSIGHT	ON	THE	ISSUES	71,	Oct.	2012	
3http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_s
ec/2012/proposed‐changes‐cola‐insight‐AARP‐ppi‐econ‐sec.pdf.	(criticism	of	the	
proposed	changes	began	before	the	budget	was	released	in	2013).	
19	The	2014	Budget	projected	that	the	change	would	result	in	a	cumulative	deficit	
reduction	over	ten	years	of	$230		billion,	of	which	$130	billion	was	attributable	to	
social	security	benefit	reduction	and	$100	billion	to	revenue	increase.		OFFICE OF 
MGMT.& BUDGET,	supra	note	171,	at	186,		191	(Tables	S‐3	and	S‐6).	
20	See	OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 
(2014).At about the same time, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics stopped publishing annual computations of the c-
CPI but continued to publish monthly updates.	
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CPI‐u.		In	combination,	the	change	to	c‐CPI	would	reduce	federal	government	
expenditures	and	increases	revenues,21	all	without	any	other	explicit	legislative	or	
regulatory	action.		In	the	realm	of	politics	and	government	budgets,	this	change	
appeared	to	present	a	nearly	painless	way	to	reduce	government	deficits.		Publicity	
and	political	reaction,	however,	ended	the	flirtation	with	the	more	accurate	c‐
CPI.."22 
	
Many	provisions	of	the	Internal	Revenue	Code	apart	from	the	rate	schedules	
likewise	reference	dollar	amounts.23		Some,	including	the	personal	exemption	and	
the	standard	deduction,	provide	automatic	inflation	adjustments	based	on	the	CPI‐
u.24		To	the	extent	that	the	c‐CPI	constitutes	a	more	accurate	corrective	for	inflation	
than	the	CPI‐u,	some	taxpayers	who	claim	deductions	or	credits	using	those	
provisions	have	been	receiving	adjustments	that	exceed	the	effects	of	inflation.		
They	have	enjoyed	unstated	cuts	in	their	real	tax	burdens.	
For	some	provisions	that	do	not	automatically	adjust	for	inflation,	Congress	
has	changed	the	dollar	amounts	from	time	to	time,	providing	a	less	systematic	offset	
to	inflation.25		Still	other	provisions	have	remained	unadjusted.26		The	failure	to	
adjust	the	dollar	amount	of	a	benefit	reduces	the	benefit’s	value.		Over	time,	the	
cumulative	reduction	acts	as	a	pro	tanto	repeal.	
	These	unadjusted	provisions	tend	to	benefit	individuals	rather	than	
businesses.		Business‐related	tax	provisions	benefit	more	consistently	from	
automatic	inflation	adjustments	than	personal	deductions	or	credits.27		Often,	the	
legislative	process	provides	no	reasons	for	distinguishing	among	base‐defining	
																																																								
21	See	OFFICE	OF	MGMT.	&	BUDGET,	supra	note	1	at	186	&	191.			
	
22	It	calls	to	mind	the	statement	attributed	to	Jean	Baptiste	Colbert:"The	art	of	
taxation	consists	in	so	plucking	the	goose	as	to	obtain	the	largest	possible	amount	of	
feathers	with	the	smallest	possible	amount	of	hissing”.	OXFORD	DICTIONARY	OF	
QUOTATIONS,	238	(Elizabeth	Knowles	ed.,	7th	ed.	2009).		
	
23	E.g.,	I.R.C.	§63	(standard	deduction),§151	(personal	exemption),	§21	(child	and	
dependent	care	credit)	and	§163(h)	(home	mortgage	interest	deduction).	
24	I.R.C.	§	151(d)(4)	(2012)(personal	exemption)	and	I.R.C.	§	63(c)(4)	(standard	
deduction)	refer	to	§1(f),	which	mandates	use	of	the	CPI‐u.	
	
25	See	e.g.,	I.R.C.	§	21	(Child	and	Dependent	Care	Credit)	In	2001,	Congress	increased	
the	maximum	amounts	of	creditable	expenses	from	$2400	to	$3000	for	one	
dependent	and	from	$4800	to	$6000	for	two	or	more	dependents	and	changed	the	
applicable	level	of	adjusted	gross	income	from	which	to	calculate	the	credit	from	
$10,000	to	$15,000	P.L.	107‐16	§204a.		See	discussion	infra.	p.		)	
26	E.g.	I.R.C.	§§	79,	1211(b)	and	1341.	
27	See	e.g.,	I.R.C.	§	45(e)(2)	(10)(B)(ii).		A	few	business‐related	provisions	make	their	
adjustments	using	a	different	metric	for	the	inflation	adjustment,	the	GNP	implicit	
price	deflator.		For	these	provisions,	assuming	the	GNP	deflator	continues	to	apply,	
any	move	from	the	CPI‐u	to	the	c‐CPI	would	have	no	effect.	
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provisions	that	receive	adjustment	and	those	that	do	not.		When	it	enacted	
automatic	inflation	adjustments	for	rates,	the	standard	deduction	and	the	personal	
exemption,	lawmakers	argued	that	no	taxpayers	should	pay	more	in	income	tax	
solely	by	reason	of	inflation.28		But	as	a	result	of	Congress’	failure	to	adjust	all	dollar	
provisions,	inflation	operates	selectively	to	increase	the	income	tax	burden	on	
certain	groups	of	taxpayers.			
	
	 One	important	area	in	which	the	Code	does	not	apply	a	specific	inflation	
adjustment	concerns	the	measurement	of	gain	and	loss	from	investment..	Under	the	
realization	requirement,	the	tax	system	defers	recognition	of	gain	or	loss	until	a	
realizatiion	event	occurs.29		When	it	does,	the	difference	between	amount	realized	
and	adjusted	basis	determines	the	extent	of	the	gain	or	loss.30		These	dollar	amounts	
derive	from	different	periods.		Any	intervening	inflation	reduces	the	buying	power	
of	the	dollars	received	later.		The	tax‐defined	gain	accordingly	will	differ	from	the	
real	gain	as	measured	in	goods	and	services.		Thus,	a	taxpayer	who	purchases	an	
asset	for	100	and	sells	it	later	for	110,	has	a	gain	of	10	for	tax	purposes.		If	inflation	
occurred	during	the	intervening	period	at	the	rate	of	7%,	the	taxpayer	needs	107	to	
restore	the	buying	power	of	the	initial	investment	and	would	have	only	3	as	the	
amount	of	real	gain.		With	no	adjustment	for	inflation,	the	tax	rule	overstates	the	
gain	subject	to	tax.		If	the	asset	appreciated	at	a	much	greater	rate,	the	effect	of	
inflation	declines,	while	if	the	asset	appreciated	at	a	rate	less	than	the	rate	of	
inflation,	the	taxpayer	might	have	a	real	loss	but	be	taxed	as	having	a	gain.		The	
preferential	treatment	of	long‐term	capital	gains	sometimes	is	justified	as	an	offset	
to	the	effects	of	inflation,	although	the	benefit	conferred	does	not	match	well	with	
the	loss	of	buying	power	to	the	original	investment.31	Inflation	similarly	can	distort	
the	proper	deduction	for	depreciation	and	depletion.		The	amount	of	capital	initially	
invested,	measured	in	nominal	dollars,	deducted	over	time	represents	declining	real	
value.		Accelerated	depreciation	arguably	provides	some	offset	to	this	effect	in	the	
aggregate.			Adjusting	debt	or	interest	payments	for	inflation	presents	difficult	
political	and	practical	problems.32	This	issue,	the	measurement	of	gain	and	loss	from	
																																																								
28	STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAXAT’N, 97TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION 
OF THE ECON. RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, 17-18 (Comm. Print 
1981).	
29	I.R.C.	§	1001(c).		
30	I.R.C.	§	1001(a).	
31	As	an	example,	assume	an	investment	of	100	and	inflation	between	purchase	and	
sale	of	10%.		If	the	investor	sells	at	107	and	recognizes	nominal	gain	of	7,	the	
reduced	rate	of	tax	on	the	gain	fails	to	compensate	for	the	loss	of	buying	power	in	
the	original	dollar	investment.		On	the	other	hand,	if	the	investor	sells	for	200,	at	the	
current	reduced	rate	of	tax	on	100	of	gain,	the	Code	overcompensates	for	the	loss	of	
buying	power	in	the	initial	investment.	
32	See	US	Dept.	of	the	Treasury,	Tax	Reform	for	Fairness,	Simplicity,	and	Economic	
Growth:	The	Treasury	Department	Report	to	the	President	(1984)	
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investment	over	time,	has	received	extensive	analysis	elsewhere	and	will	not	be	
addressed	in	this	paper	.33	 	
This	article	first	considers	some	of	the	effects	of	automatic	inflation	
adjustments	using	the	CPI‐u.		It	then	examines	some	examples	of	the	selective	
omission	of	automatic	inflation	adjustments.	
	
II.		Effects	of	adjustments	for	inflation	
	
The	rate	structure	
	
The	Code	calculates	the	individual	income	tax	using	a	progressive	rate	
schedule.34		The	rate	structure	applies	increasing	percentages	to	dollar	denominated	
brackets.		Progressivity	has	its	critics,	but	has	been	embedded	in	the	individual	
income	tax	virtually	since	its	inception.		Several	fairness	rationales	argue	for	
progressivity.35		One	rationale	for	progressive	rate	taxation	lies	in	the	intuition	that	
the	marginal	utility	of	money	declines	as	income	increases.	36	In	other	words,	the	
next	dollar	means	more	to	a	poor	person	than	it	does	to	a	rich	one,	so	the	latter	can	
afford	to	pay	more	of	it	in	taxes.37	Determining	the	extent	to	which	this	holds	true	
calls	for	speculation,	but	assuming	it	does,	the	marginal	utility	of	money	probably	
declines	at	different	rates	for	different	people,	and	averaging	these	rates	would	be	
arbitrary	as	a	measure	of	individual	utility.	The	rate	brackets	in	the	Code	do	not	
																																																								
33	Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48, TAX L. REV. 537 
(1992); Daniel Halperin and Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the 
Tax System for Inflation in Uneasy Compromise (Aaron, 
Galper and Pechman, eds. Brookings 1988),347 – 383; Michael 
C Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for 
Policymaking, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1217 (1989).   
	
34	I.R.C. § 1 contains	five	rate	schedules.		Four	apply	to	individuals	with	varied	
marital	or	family	status.		All	impose	progressive	rates.		For	convenience,	this	text	
refers	to	a	single	rate	schedule,	that	for	married	individuals	filing	joint	returns.		A	
similar	analysis	would	apply	to	the	other	three	individual	rate	schedules.		The	fifth	
rate	schedule,	applicable	to	trust	and	estates,	provides	much	faster	progressivity,	in	
order	to	discourage	using	the	trust	and	estate	entities	to	avoid	the	higher	levels	of	
the	individual	rates.	
	
35	Much	writing	has	discussed	the	subject	of	progressivity	in	the	income	tax.		The	
classic	work	is		Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). 
36	Id. at 455-456; see also STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
97TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF THE ECON. RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 
1981, 11 Dec. 31, 1981 
37	Id. 
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purport	to	track	declining	marginal	utility	of	money	in	a	systematic	way.		They	
constitute	only	a	gross	approximation	of	“ability	to	pay”	as	so	understood.		Another	
rationale	for	a	progressive	rate	schedule	sees	it	as	offsetting	regressive	state	and	
local	tax	systems.		Again,	no	specific	legislative	effort	has	been	made	to	assemble	
and	study	the	widely	varying	tax	systems	of	the	states	and	localities	to	determine	
the	appropriate	national	balance	for	any	regressive	effects.38		A	third	rationale	
argues	explicitly	for	redistribution	of	income	to	achieve	greater	social	equality.39		
Taxation	constitutes	one	of	the	few	tools	available	to	government	for	this	purpose.	
40	The	rate	schedule	represents	a	mix	of	these	objectives,	balanced	with	
considerations	of	efficiency.41		In	short,	the	progressivity	in	the	rates	reflects	a	
political	allocation	of	the	tax	burden	by	income	which,	like	any	political	outcome,	
can	be	expected	to	shift	from	time	to	time.	
	
Inflation	alters	the	political	bargain	represented	by	the	rate	structure,	as	it		
reduces	the	real	value	of	the	dollar	amounts	that	define	the	rate	brackets.42		If	the	
dollar	amounts	in	the	rate	schedule	remained	unadjusted,	most	real	incomes,	
including	those	that	are	only	keeping	pace	with	inflation,	would	move	more	quickly	
into	higher	brackets.	If	rates	remained	the	same,	the	tax	would	take	a	larger	share	of	
the	individual’s	buying	power	than	it	had	the	year	before.		Assume	an	individual	
who	receives	income	adjusted	for	inflation.		When	an	unadjusted	progressive	rate	
structure	defined	by	dollar	cutoff	amounts	applies	to	the	inflation‐adjusted	income,	
it	increases	the	percentage	of	real	income	paid	in	taxes	at	all	but	the	lowest		income	
levels.	This	increase	in	effective	rates	on	real	income	is	often	referred	to	as		“bracket	
creep.”43		The	effect	varies	over	the	range	of	incomes.		A	taxpayer	with	modest	
taxable	income,	reduced	to	zero	after	deduction	and	credits,	continues	to	incur	no	
tax.44		But	once	taxable	income	rises	above	that	level,	relatively	more	income	incurs	
																																																								
38	I	know	of	no	study/	effort	that	has	been	done.	
39 See e.g. Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 
37 Ariz.L.Rev. 739 (), discussing the redistribution of 
wealth.	
40		Other	tools	include	direct	grants	and	in‐kind	governmental	subsidies.	
41	See generally Blum & Kalven supra note 34 (discussion of 
efficiency). 
42	See, e.g., illustration infra p. 13. 
43	See e.g., KIEFER supra note 6 at 5 (“bracket creep[:](the 
increase in taxes resulting from inflation under an 
unchanged tax system”).	
44	For	2015	a	married	couple	filing	jointly	may	claim	a	standard	deduction	of	
$12,600	and	two	personal	exemptions	of	$4,000.		Rev.	Proc.	2014‐61,	I.R.B.	2014‐47.		
If	their	income	lies	below	$20,600,	they	would	have	zero	taxable	income	and	no	tax	
liability.		For	a	discussion	of	possible	refundable	credits	see			infra	.	
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tax	at	the	taxpayer’s	higher	marginal	rate	than	before.		Once	a	taxpayer	reaches	the	
highest	marginal	rate,	the	rate	of	increase	in	tax	slows.			
Inflation	thus	increases	the	government’s	tax	of	real	income	and	shifts	the	
relative	burden	of	the	tax	away	from	the	highest	earners.		Congress	could	restore	
the	status	quo	or	make	other	changes	if	it	chose	to	respond	directly	to	the	effects	of	
inflation.		Automatic	inflation	adjustments	prevent	bracket	creep	and	maintain	both	
the	level	of	real	income	paid	in	taxes	and	the	existing	distribution	of	the	tax	burden	
among	taxpayers	in	real	terms.		Inflation	adjustments	conserve	the	pre‐existing	
political	arrangement	and	shift	the	onus	of	legislative	action	to	proponents	of	
change.45	
	 	
Indexing	the	tax	rates	
	 Prior	to	1980,	Congress	responded	to	bracket	creep	with	periodic	tax	
reductions.	46		As	a	consequence,	the	net	burden	of	income	taxation	for	the	previous	
fifteen	years	(income	taxes	as	a	percentage	of	gross	national	product)	remained	
relatively	constant,	notwithstanding	the	high	inflation	rates	of	the	1970’s.47		The	
experience	of	those	years,	however,	drew	increased	attention	to	the	relationship	
between	price	inflation	and	income	taxation.48		In	1978	leading	members	of	the	
Republican	party	in	the	House	of	Representatives	pressed	for	automatic	inflation	
adjustments.49			One	of	their	stated	reasons	for	change	criticized	the	periodic	
adjustment	process.		Democrats,	they	argued,	took	credit	for	tax	cuts	that	merely	
kept	pace	with	inflation.		The	Democratic	majority	in	Congress	rejected	the	proposal.		
The	House	Ways	and	Means	Committee	report	argued	that	Congress’	periodic	
adjustments	of	the	rates	and	other	Code	provisions	took	account	of	inflation	and	
operated	more	appropriately	than	automatic	adjustments	would.		Discretionary	
adjustments	focus	tax	cuts	where	policy	makers	deem	them	appropriate.		They	
allow	for	selective	cuts	in	the	rates.		Automatic	indexing,	on	the	other	hand,	would	
																																																								
45	See	discussion	infra	p.	X;	see	also	KIEFER	supra	note	29	at	5.	
	
46	See KIEFER supra note 6 at 5. 
47	See id. at 11(table 2 shows effective tax rate in 
inflation adjusted dollars in terms of revenue). 
48	See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 5829, at 11, 23 (1980). 
	
49	Indexation of Certain Provisions of the Tax Laws: Hearing 
on S. 2738 Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt 
Management Generally of the S. Committee on Finance, 95th 
Cong. 22-29 (1978)(statement of Rep. Bill Gradison- R, OH); 
~~[Anti-Inflation tax Reduction and Reform Act, H.R. 11413, 
95th Cong. (1978) (would have placed automatic inflation 
adjustments to the personal income tax brackets but died in 
committee).]. 
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make	it	harder	for	Congress	to	engage	in	“responsible	fiscal	policy”	and	provide	
timely	tax	changes.		The	benefits	of	automatic	indexing,	it	concluded,	could	be	
achieved	better	with	occasional	legislative	tax	cuts.	
	
In	1981,	however,	after	Republican	electoral	victories,	Congress	reversed	
course.		Public	concern	about	“bracket	creep”	doubtless	contributed	pressure	to	
change.		Inflation	ran	at	13.5%	in	1980	and	10.3%	in	1981.		The	income	tax	rate	
schedule	contained	fifteen	brackets	above	zero,	from	14%	to	70%.		Perhaps	the	
misperception	by	some	constituents,	that	when	a	taxpayer	moved	to	a	higher	
bracket	all	the	income,	not	just	the	marginal	dollars,	suffered	tax	at	the	higher	rate,	
deepened	the	anxiety	surrounding	bracket	creep	and	increased	pressure	on		
Congress	to	act.			Congress	enacted	a	partial	solution.	
	
The	1981	Economic	Recovery	Tax	Act	included	automatic	inflation	
adjustments	for	the	rate	schedule,	including	the	zero	bracket	amount	(later	
reincarnated	as	the	standard	deduction),	and	the	personal	exemption,	to	begin	in	
1985.50	Congress	subsequently	extended	automatic	inflation	adjustments	to	many	
other	fixed	dollar	amounts	in	the	Code.51		The	automatic	adjustments	have	survived	
into	an	era	of	much	lower	inflation	rates	as	well	as	a	smaller	number	of	tax	
brackets.52		Congress	mandated	calculation	of	the	adjustments	with	reference	to	the	
consumer	price	index.53	But	that	index,	as	already	noted,	may	overstate	the	effects	
of	inflation.		
	
	 The	1981	Joint	Committee	report	offered	a	number	of	rationales	for	the	
change	to	automatic	indexing.		It	characterized	the	“automatic	tax	increases”	caused	
by	inflation	as	unfair	to	taxpayers	“since	their	tax	burden	as	a	percentage	of	income	
could	increase	during	intervals	between	tax	reduction	legislation,	with	an	adverse	
effect	on	incentives	to	work	and	invest.”		The	increased	taxes	would	provide	the	
Federal	government	with	an	automatic	increase	in	dollars	of	revenue,	creating	
pressure	for	further	spending.		It	viewed	inflationary	increases	in	real	tax	burdens	
as	inconsistent	with	the	rate	reductions	ERTA	enacted.		Indexing,	it	said,	will	“avoid	
the	past	pattern	of	inequitable,	unlegislated	tax	increases	and	induced	spending.”	
	 Leaving	aside	the	effects	of	inflation	on	the	income	tax	base,	discussed	below,	
its	precise	effect	on	a	taxpayer’s	tax	burden	depends	on	where	in	the	rate	table	the	
income	falls.		As	an	illustration,	suppose	a	married	taxpayer	filing	jointly,	at	the	
midpoint	of	the	15%	bracket,	earns	taxable	income	of	$43,000	and	incurs	tax	of	
$5,600.		The	tax	amounts	to	13.02%	of	taxable	income.		Suppose	inflation	of	20%	
																																																								
50	Pub.	L.	97‐34	sec.	104(f).		Adjustments	for	the	zero	bracket	amount	and	the	
personal	exemption	cross‐refer	to	this	section.		P.L.	97‐34,	Secs.	62(b)	and	(c).	
51	Lawrence	Axelrod,	of	the	Office	of	Chief	Counsel	of	the	Internal	Revenue	Service,	
has	listed	47	current	provisions	indexed	for	inflation.		See	Axelrod,	Chain,	Chain,	
Chain:	Taxes	and	Chained	CPI,	139	Tax	Notes,	461	(April	22,	2013)	
52	Inflation	in	2011	and	2012	ran	at	the	rate	of	3.2%	and	2.1%	respectively.		The	rate	
schedule	for	2013	contains	six	brackets.	
53	Specifically,	the	CPI‐u.	
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over	five	years.	If	income	rises	at	the	rate	of	inflation,	taxable	income	will	grow	to	
$50,304	in	year	5.		The	unadjusted	tax	on	it	amounts	to	$6,696.		The	percentage	of	
income	paid	in	tax	comes	to	13.31%.		The	taxpayer	has	incurred	an	additional	tax	of	
0.29%	on	all	of	the	taxable	income,	amounting	to	an	additional	$146.	
	
		 For	income	at	the	midpoint	of	the	25%	bracket,	the	taxpayer	earns	taxable	
income	of	$104,175	and	incurs	tax	of	$18,293.		The	tax	amounts	to	17.56%	of	
taxable	income.	If	the	income	rises	exactly	at	the	rate	of	inflation,20%	over	five	
years,	it	will	rise	to	$121,870	in	year	5.		The	unadjusted	tax	on	it	amounts	to	$22,717.		
The	percentage	of	income	paid	in	taxes	comes	to	18.64%.		The	taxpayer	has	
incurred	an	additional	tax	of	1.08%	on	all	of	the	taxable	income,	amounting	to	
$1,125	in	real	dollar	terms.	
	
	 At	the	bottom	of	the	income	range,	a	taxpayer	whose	income	in	year	5	falls	
below	the	sum	of	the	unadjusted	standard	deduction	and	personal	exemptions	
incurs	no	tax	liability	and	suffers	no	increase	in	tax	as	a	result	of	inflation.		At	the	top	
of	the	income	range,	the	percentage	effects	of	inflation	on	the	rate	brackets	decline	
as	income	increases.		Thus,	the	effects	of	unadjusted	progressive	rates	fall	most	
heavily	on	the	broad	middle	range	of	taxpayers.	
	
	 Adjustment	of	the	tax	rates	automatically	eliminates	increases	in	real	tax,	
preserving	the	prior	allocation	of	tax	burdens.54		In	the	absence	of	automatic	
inflation	adjustments,	Congress	would	have	several	choices:	do	nothing	and	affirm	a	
silent	increase	in	the	level	of	income	taxation;	change	rates	periodically,	and	act	to	
maintain	the	prior	order	in	real	dollar	terms;	change	rates	but	enact	a	reallocation	
of	the	tax	burden.		Given	that	Congress	generallly	finds	it	easier	to	reduce	taxes	than	
to	raise	them,	automatic	inflation	adjustments	help	to	foreclose	the	first	and	third	
possibilities.		Thus,	automatic	adjustments	have	implications	for	legislative	action.	
Unadjusted	inflation	raises	the	real	tax	burden	without	Congressional	action.55		
Congress	then	can	respond	and	adjust	the	results	if	necessary.		Given	the	political	
barriers	to	raising	taxes	as	compared	with	the	ease	with	which	Congress	can	reduce	
taxes,	inflation	can	provide	a	political	“cushion”	to	enable	Congress	to	change	the	
level	of	taxation.		Automatic	adjustments	eliminate	the	cushion	and	make	it	harder	
to	increase	effective	rates.	
	
	 On	the	other	hand,	from	a	public	choice	perspective,	we	should	applaud	the	
automatic	adjustments.		Discretionary	adjustments	enhance	the	ability	of	powerful	
legislators	to	provide	targeted	benefits	for	supporters	and	friends.		Automatic	
adjustments	take	this	power	out	of	their	hands	and	eliminate	the	potential	pool	of	
government	funds	for	distribution.	
Corporate	Income	Tax	
																																																								
54	Adjustment	of	the	personal	exemption	and	standard	deduction	amounts	
contributes	to	this	effect,	see	p.		infra.	
55	See	discussion	of	bracket	creep,	infra.	p.			
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	 The	corporate	income	tax	also	applies	progressive	rates.56				The	Code	taxes	
the	first	$75,000	at	rates	significantly	lower	than	the	stated	top	rate	of	35%.57		It	
phases	out	the	benefit	of	the	lower	rates	in	a	range	of	income	from	$100,000	to	
$339,000.		It	imposes	a	nominal	34%	rate	on	income	from	$75,000	to	$10,000,000,	
but	phases	out	that	1%	benefit	for	income	over	$15,000,000.		It	is	unclear	what	the	
rationale	may	be	for	any	progressivity	in	corporate	rates,	apart	from	congressional	
generosity	for	small	business.		The	Code	does	not	index	these	rates	for	inflation.		As	
a	consequence	the	real	value	of	any	graduation	in	corporate	rates	has	declined.			
Perhaps	the	availability	of	pass‐through	treatment	for	unincorporated	entities,	
some	corporate	entities	and	limited	liability	companies	has	rendered	this	effect	less	
significant.	
	
Alternative	Minimum	Tax	
	 Until	recently	the	alternative	minimum	tax	(AMT)	contained	no	automatic	
inflation	adjustments.		The	AMT	calculates	tax	on	a	broader	base	but	at	a	lower	rate	
than	the	regular	income	tax.	It	provides	a	two‐bracket	rate	schedule	and	a	
substantial	exemption	amount,	stated	in	dollars,	which	varies	with	marital	status	
and	phases	out	with	income	level.		In	order	to	prevent	the	expansion	of	the	AMT	to	
taxpayers	with	lower	real	incomes,	Congress	“patched”	the	AMT	annually.		When	
Congress	reduced	income	tax	rates	in	2001	and	2003,	it	did	not	cut	the	AMT	rates.		
Since	the	AMT	consists	of	the	excess	of	the	tentative	AMT	over	the	regular	tax,	
reduction	in	the	regular	tax	increased	the	number	of	taxpayers	subject	to	AMT.		
Congress	responded	by	increasing	the	exemption	amounts	annually	to	limit	
expansion	of	the	AMT	and	take	account	of	year‐to‐year	inflation.		In	2012	Congress	
permanently	increased	the	fixed	dollar	amounts	in	the	AMT	and	introduced	
automatic	inflation	adjustments,	effective	beginning	in	2013.		The	bracket	amount	in	
the	AMT	rate	schedule,	the	exemption	levels	and	the	phaseout	of	the	exemption	
amounts,	all	now	receive	annual	inflation	adjustments.	
	 These	changes	dissipate	the	annual	pressure	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	the	
AMT	and	appear	to	cement	the	AMT’s	position	as	a	permanent	supplement	to	the	
regular	income	tax.		Critics	continue	to	advocate	repeal	of	the	AMT.		Rep.	Camp’s	tax	
reform	proposals	included	a	recommendation	for	its	repeal.		
The	proponents	of	an	AMT	initially	sought	to	limit	a	taxpayer’s	ability	to	
reduce	tax	liability	unduly	through	combinations	of	different	deductions	and	credits.		
The	current	structure	of	the	AMT	generally	fails	to	do	so,	while	adding	a	complex	
parallel	calculation	to	the	regular	individual	income	tax.		Repeal	would	lose	
substantial	revenue,	but	that	shortfall	could	be	made	up	more	directly	through	the	
regular	income	tax.		Unfortunately,	that	change	would	require	engaging	in	a	political	
battle	that	elected	officials	have	little	incentive	to	conduct.		Inertia	carries	the	AMT	
forward.	
	
Deductions	and	credits	
																																																								
56	IRC	section	11.	
57	Code	sections	1561	and	1551	limit	the	ability	of	a	single	enterprise	to	obtain	
multiple	benefits	from	the	lower	rates	through	several	incorporations.	
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While	the	dollar	amounts	in	the	rate	schedule	represent	the	most	obvious	
subject	for	adjustment,	inflation	also	affects	many	other	parts	of	the	tax	calculation.		
The	value	of	deductions	stated	as	dollar	amounts	declines	with	inflation,	leading	to	
increased	tax	burdens	unless	adjusted.58		Limits	on	benefits	stated	as	dollar	
amounts	likewise	decline	and	thereby	increase	tax	burdens	unless	adjusted.	
	
The	Standard	Deduction	
	 Automatic	inflation	adjustments	for	the	rates	have	been	closely	linked	to	
similar	adjustments	for	the	standard	deduction.		The	present‐day	standard	
deduction	serves	two	somewhat	distinct	functions	in	the	income	tax.59		Congress	
originally	created	the	standard	deduction	to	ease	the	expansion	of	the	income	tax	
during	World	War	II.		Previously,	only	a	small	percentage	of	Americans	paid	any	
income	tax.60		By	1945,	more	than	70%	of	households	filed	returns.		The	prospect	of	
the	new	tens	of	millions	of	taxpayers	keeping	records	of	itemized	deductions,	
followed	by	government	audits	of	small	amounts,	presented	an	administrative	
nightmare.		Congress	accordingly	crafted	the	standard	deduction	as	a	simplifying	
alternative	to	itemization	of	certain	deductions	from	gross	income,	such	as	state	and	
local	taxes.		The	standard	deduction	initially	consisted	of	a	percentage	of	adjusted	
gross	income	up	to	a	ceiling	amount.		The	standard	deduction	has	undergone	
several	structural	changes	over	time.		In	its	present	form	it	allows	a	taxpayer	to	
deduct	a	fixed	dollar	amount	in	lieu	of	claiming	the	itemized	deductions.61			
	
	 Congress	later	endorsed	a	second	function	for	the	standard	deduction.		Along	
with	the	personal	exemption,	it	excludes	from	the	tax	base	an	amount	of	income	
sufficient	for	subsistence,	generally	identified	with	the	official	poverty	level.			This	
																																																								
58	See e.g.,numerical illustrations infra p. . (illustrating 
effect inflation real value of fixed dollar amounts) 
59	See	generally,	John	H.	Brooks	II,	Doing	Too	Much:		The	Standard	Deduction	and	the	
Conflict	Between	Progrssivity	and	Simplification,	2	COLUM.	J.	TAX	L.	203	(2011).		See	
also	Louis	Kaplow,	The	Standard	Deduction	and	Floors	in	the	Income	Tax,	50	Tax	L.	
Rev.	1	(1994);	Allan	J.	Samansky,	Nonstandard	Thoughts	About	the	Standard	
Deduction,	1991	UTAH	L.	REV.	531;	Glenn	E.	Coven,	The	Decline	and	Fall	of	Taxable	
Income,	79	MICH.	L.	REV.	1525,	1556‐64	(1981);	Alan	L.	Feld,	Fairness	in	Rate	Cuts	in	
the	Individual	Income	Tax,	69	CORNELL	L.	REV.	429,	441	(1983);	and	Theodore	P.	
Seto	and	Sande	L.	Buhai,	Tax	and	Disability:		Ability	to	Pay	and	the	Taxation	of	
Difference,	154	U.	PA	L.	REV.	1053,	1088‐93	(2006).	
60	See	Eric	M.	Jensen,	The	Taxing	Power,	the	Sixteenth	Amendment,	and	the	Meaning	
of	“Incomes”,	33	Ariz	St.	L.	J.	1057,	1103	(only	1%	of	the	population	were	initially	
subject	to	income	taxes).		
61	Code	section	63(c).		For	2015	the	standard	deduction	amount	for	a	married	
couple	filing	jointly	is	$12,600,	half	that	amount	for	a	single	individual	or	a	married	
person	filing	separately,	and	$$9,250	for	a	head	of	household.	Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 
2014-47 I.R.B. 	
	 15
exclusion	of	income	from	the	tax	base	adds	to	the	progressivity	expressed	in	the	tax	
rates.	62	
	 The	simplification	objective	gives	only	very	rough	guidance	as	to	how	high	or	
low	to	set	the	amount	of	the	standard	deduction.		Different	taxpayers	incur	varied	
amounts	of	the	expenses	that	give	rise	to	itemized	deductions.		In	general,	a	
taxpayer	will	claim	the	standard	deduction	when	it	exceeds	the	total	of	the	itemized	
deductions	that	the	taxpayer	otherwise	could	claim.		In	recent	years	about	two‐
thirds	of	tax	return	filers	have	claimed	the	standard	deduction.63		A	larger	dollar	
amount	would	reduce	the	number	of	itemizers,	but	also	would	increase	the	number	
of	taxpayers	whose	standard	deduction	will	exceed	the	actual	itemized	deductions	
for	which	it	supposedly	substitutes.			A	smaller	standard	deduction	would	tend	to	
increase	the	number	of	itemizers	and	reduce	the	extent	of	the	simplification,	both	
for	individual	taxpayers	and	for	the	IRS.64		
The	standard	deduction	as	currently	structured	confers	on	many	taxpayers	
with	no	or	modest	itemizable	deductions	a	significantly	larger	deduction	than	
simple	substitution	for	the	actual	expenses.			Compare	the	Smiths,	a	married	couple	
who	rent	their	home,	with	the	Joneses,	a	couple	who	own	their	home,	each	couple	
earning	wages	income	in	2015	of	$50,000.		The	Joneses	incur	and	deduct	mortgage	
interest	expense	and	real	property	taxes.65		Assume	these	amount	to	$15,000	and	
that	neither	couple	has	any	other	itemized	deductions.		The	Smiths	will	claim	the	
standard	deduction	of	$12,600,	which,	in	their	case,	“substitutes”	for	their	itemized	
deductions	of	zero.		They	receive	the	full	standard	deduction	benefit	without	any	
inquiry	as	to	whether	they	have	any	itemized	expenses.	66		Since	the	Jones’	itemized	
deductions	exceed	the	standard	deduction,	they	will	itemize	their	deductions.		But	
setting	the	standard	deduction	at	a	high	level	dilutes	the	value	and	incentive	effects	
of	their	itemized	deductions.		The	Joneses	in	the	example	will	be	able	to	deduct	
$15,000	as	itemized	deductions,	but	that	amount	is	only	$2,400	more	than	the	
Smiths’	deduction.			At	a	marginal	tax	rate	of	15%,	the	Joneses	save	$360	in	federal	
income	tax	as	compared	with	the	Smiths.		This	amount	is	far	less	than	the	$2,250	
benefit	the	Joneses	might	expect	to	receive	when	they	simply	multiply	their	
																																																								
62	The	standard	deduction	removes	a	portion	of	income	from	the	tax	base;	the	
percentage	of	taxable	income	eliminated	by	the	standard	deduction	decreases	as	
income	rises.	
63	See	I.R.S.	Table	1.2,	Stat.	Income	Pub.	1304	(2010)	Rev.	08‐2012.		(In	2010,	out	of	
142,892,051	total	returns	filed,	93,678.175	claimed	the	standard	deduction	
(65.6%));	I.R.S.	Table	1.2	,Stat	Income	Pub.	1304	(2011)	Rev.	08‐2013	(In	2011,	out	
of	145,370,240	total	returns	filed,	96,619,312	claimed	the	standard	deduction	
(66.5%);	I.R.S.	Table	1.2	Stat	Income	Pub.	1304	(2012)	Rev.	08‐214	(In	2012,	out	of	
144,928,472	total	returns	filed,	97,208,513	claimed	the	standard	deduction	(67.1%).	
64	See	also		John	H.	Brooks	II,	Doing	Too	Much:		The	Standard	Deduction	and	the	
Conflict	Between	Progressivity	and	Simplification,	2	COLUM.	J.	TAX	L.	203	(2011).		
65	I.R.C.	§	163	allows	taxpayers		with	mortgages	on	a	their	residences	to	deduct	
interest	in	computing	taxable	income.		I.R.C.	§	164	allows	a	deduction	for	certain	
state	and	local	taxes,	including	real	property	taxes.	
66	See	Rev.	Proc	supra	note	61.	
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deductible	expenses	by	their	marginal	tax	rate.			In	this	example,	the	Smiths	enjoy	a	
substitute	deduction	for	nonexistent	expenses,	while	the	Joneses	receive	a	limited	
marginal	benefit	for	their	actual	expenses.		
	
As	currently	in	effect,	the	standard	deduction	in	fact	may	serve	as	an	implicit	
offset,	especially	for	taxpayers	in	lower	tax	brackets,	for	itemized	deductions	
untouchable	directly	through	the	political	process.		The	package	of	homeowner	
benefits,	including	the	deductions	for	mortgage	interest	and	taxes,	has	been	
criticized	as	an	inefficient	incentive	to	invest	in	homeownership.67		Nevertheless,	
these	deductions	enjoy	strong	political	support.		By	providing	a	large	standard	
deduction,	the	Code	implicitly	reduces	the	attractiveness	of	the	itemized	deductions.		
Assume	the	Smiths	in	the	earlier	example	pay	rent	expense	of	$15,000	and	cannot	
deduct	that	expense.		Without	the	standard	deduction	the	disparate	tax	treatment	
between	them	and	the	Joneses	would	be	far	greater.		Note	that	the	benefit	of	the	
itemized	deductions	grows	more	than	proportionately	with	the	size	of	those	
deductions,	If	the	Joneses	had	double	the	interest	and	real	property	tax	expense,	
$30,000,	the	excess	over	the	standard	deduction	amount	would	rise	to	$17,800.68			
An	excessively	large	standard	deduction	available	to	renters	dilutes	the	
incentive	effects	of	the	tax	deductions	for	homeownership.		If	every	potential	
taxpayer	receives	one	or	another	tax	break,	the	benefit	targeted	to	homeownership	
is	mitigated.		When	Rep.	David	Camp,	Chairman	of	the	House	Ways	and	Means	
Committee,	published	his	proposals	for	income	tax	reform	as	the	2014	Chairman’s	
mark,	they	included	a	significant	increase	in	the	standard	deduction	and	elimination	
of	the	personal	exemption.		The	change,	the	proposal	said,	would	help	to	simplify	tax	
return	filing.		The	larger	standard	deduction	would	have	done	so	by	increasing	the	
percentage	of	nonitemizers	to	an	estimated	95%	of	all	taxpayers.		As	a	corollary,	the	
incentive	effects	of	the	mortgage	interest	and	real	property	tax	deductions	would	
have	disappeared	for	the	new	standard	deduction	filers	and	would	have	been	
reduced	for	taxpayers	who	continued	to	itemize.		
	
	 Some	evidence	points	to	an	increase	over	time	in	the	proportion	of	itemized	
deductions	represented	by	the	standard	deduction.		Since	taxpayers	claiming	the	
standard	deduction	do	not	report	the	itemized	deductions	they	otherwise	would	
have	claimed,	we	can	make	no	direct	comparison	of	the	effects	of	inflation	on	both.		
Instead,	I	have	used	as	a	surrogate	for	comparison	purposes,	the	average	itemized	
deductions	claimed	by	taxpayers	in	the	same	adjusted	gross	income	range	who	did	
not	take	the	standard	deduction.			The	IRS	reports	itemized	deductions	by	income	
																																																								
67	See	e.g.,	Rebecca	N.	Morrow,	Billions	Of	Tax	Dollars	Spent	Inflating	The	Housing	
Bubble:	How	and	Why	the	Mortgage	Interest	Deduction	Failed,17	FORDHAM	J.	CORP.	
&	FIN.	L.	751;	Benjamin	H.	Harris,	C.	Eugene	Steuerle,	Amanda	Eng,	New	Perspectives	
on	Homeownership	Tax	Incentives,	141TAX	NOTES	1315(2013);	Eric	Toder,	et	al.	
Reforming	the	Mortgage	Interest	Deduction,	Urban	Institute	(2010) 
68	At	high	levels	of	adjusted	gross	income	($300,000	in	the	case	of	a	couple	filing	a	
joint	return),	the	Code	imposes	direct	reductions	on	the	allowable	itemized	
deductions,	IRC	Section	68.	
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intervals.		A	change	over	time	in	the	ratio	of	the	standard	deduction	to	the	average	
itemized	deduction	for	that	income	interval	would	suggest	the	extent	to	which	the	
inflation	adjustments	to	the	standard	deduction	under	or	over	compensate.		For	
joint	return	filers	in	1990	with	adjusted	gross	income	of	$40,000	‐	$50,000	the	
standard	deduction	amounted	to	50.2%	of	the	average	itemized	deduction.		For	the	
same	dollar	interval	in	2010	the	percentage	was	57.8%.		In	the	$50,000‐	$75,000	
range,	the	respective	numbers	were	41.66%	and	56.2%.			While	the	comparison	is	
not	definitive,	since	the	dollar	intervals	themselves	are	not	adjusted	for	inflation,	the	
increase	is	suggestive.	69	
	
	 Substitution	of	the	c‐CPI	for	the	CPI‐u	as	the	adjuster	for	the	standard	
deduction	would	slow	or	reverse	any	increase	in	its	relative	coverage.		If	that	
occurred,	more	taxpayers	likely	would	itemize,	with	some	increased	administrative	
costs	in	record	keeping,	reporting	and	auditing	burdens.	
	
The	standard	deduction	serves	another	function	in	the	individual	income	
tax	.70		Together	with	the	personal	exemption,	the	standard	deduction	operates	to	
exempt	from	taxation	an	amount	of	income	representing	an	individual	or	household	
level	of	subsistence.		By	placing	the	minimum	amount	needed	for	food,	clothing	and	
shelter	beyond	the	reach	of	the	income	tax,		these	allowances	leave	an	amount	
roughly	equivalent	to	discretionary	income	subject	to	tax.		The	Code	currently	
adjusts	both	the	standard	deduction	and	the	personal	exemption	for	inflation.71		
Taxpayers	whose	incomes	fall	below	this	exclusion	amount	do	not	benefit	from	any	
inflation	adjustment.	The	increase	in	dollar	amount	created	by	an	inflation	
adjustment	affects	only	those	with	incomes	near	to	or	larger	than	the	poverty	
level.72	
	
	 In	setting	the	appropriate	subsistence	level	for	income	measurement	
purposes,	analysts	ordinarily	look	to	the	standard	“poverty	level.”		The	poverty	level,	
calculated	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services,	consists	of	an	
estimate	of	the	cost	of	a	basket	of	goods	and	services,	adjusted	annually	for	inflation.			
The	poverty	level	calculation	and	the	tax	adjustments	for	inflation	currently	employ	
the	same	index,	the	CPI‐u,	as	the	measure	of	their	respective	adjustments.		Once	
established,	the	combined	personal	exemption	and	standard	deduction	accordingly	
should	maintain	a	consistent	relationship	to	the	official	poverty	level.	
	
																																																								
69	For	single	individuals	the	comparable	ratios	were	as	follows:	
	 Adjusted	gross	income	 1990	 	 2010	
	 	 40,000‐50,000	 34.5	 	 39.2	
	 	 50,000‐75,000	 23.5	 	 35.6	
70	Some	scholars	have	questioned	whether	the	provision	can	perform	these	two	
functions	efficiently	See		supra.	note	
71	I.R.C.	§§	63(c)(4),	151(d)(4)	
72	Taxpayers	with	low	and	moderate	incomes	may	also	benefit	from	the	earned	
income	tax	credit.		See			infra.	
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	 Two	observations	modify	this	simple	connection.	First,	the	calculation	of	the	
poverty	level	itself	has	received	significant	criticism.	The	poverty	level	counts	only	
cash	income.		It	does	not	count	in‐kind	government	aid	such	as	food	stamps.		Nor	
does	it	include	assistance	in	the	form	of	an	income	tax	refund	under	the	earned	
income	credit.73		Also,	although	the	basket	of	goods	and	services	on	which	the	
calculation	is	based	has	remained	constant,	the	relative	costs	of	subsistence	
consumption	have	shifted	over	time.		Food	has	become	less	expensive,	housing	
more	so.		Efforts	to	modify	the	basket	have	failed	lest	the	new	measure	create	
political	difficulty:		either	it	will	show	that	the	number	of	poor	people	has	grown,	an	
embarrassment	to	the	party	in	power,	or	it	will	show	that	the	number	has	declined,	
diminishing	the	arguments	of	those	advocating	for	more	aid	to	the	poor.	Moreover,	
change	could	impair	comparability	across	time	periods.		For	these	and	other	reasons,	
the	measure	of	the	poverty	level	continues	in	its	inexact	state.			Since	2011	the	US	
Census	Bureau	has	calculated	a	Supplementary	Poverty	Level,	which	seeks	to	
measure	poverty	by	consumption	rather	than	income.		This	measure	reports	slightly	
fewer	children	in	poverty	and	slightly	more	older	folks,	findings	which	could	
generate	political	consequences.		The	standard	deduction	and	the	personal	
exemption	together	were	supposed	to	exclude	income	below	the	poverty	level,	but	
that	measure	that	has	become	increasingly	inexact	as	a	measure	of	minimum	well‐
being.		
	
The	proposed	change	to	c‐CPI	in	the	President’s	2014	budget	excluded	non‐
means	tested	benefit	programs.		Apparently,	the	poverty	level	would	have	continued	
make	its	adjustments	using	the	CPI‐u.			A	change	to	the	c‐CPI	for	income	tax	
adjustments	but	not	for	calculation	of	the	poverty	level	would	create	a	greater	
divergence	between	the	standard	deduction	and	the	poverty	level.	74	
	
Second,	the	combined	personal	exemption/standard	deduction	amount	
approximates	but	fails	to	hit	the	existing	poverty	level	numbers	accurately.		The	
total	provides	a	higher	exemption	amount	for	families	and	a	lower	exemption	for	
individuals.		For	a	family	of	four,	the	poverty	level	amount	for	2015	was	$24,250,	
while	the	standard	deduction	for	a	married	couple	with	two	children	plus	four	
personal	exemptions	amounted	to	$28,600.		For	a	single	parent	with	three	children,	
the	standard	deduction	plus	four	personal	exemptions	amounted	to	$25,250,	closer	
to	the	poverty	level.75		The	poverty	level	for	a	single	individual	came	to	$11,490,	but	
the	sum	of	the	standard	deduction	and	one	personal	exemption	amounted	to	only	
$10,300.	The	numbers	would	hit	their	target	more	accurately	if	the	personal	
exemption	increased	by	more	than	the	current	inflation	adjustment	and	the	
standard	deduction	by	less		
	
	 Two	tax	credits	further	complicate	consideration	of	the	standard	deduction’s	
role	in	excluding	taxpayers	below	the	poverty	level	from	paying	income	tax,	the	
																																																								
73	See	infra.	p.		
74	See	discussion	supra,	p.	21.	
75	The	standard	deduction	used	is	for	head	of	household,	$9,250	for	2015.	
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child	tax	credit76	and	the	earned	income	credit.77		The	child	credit	currently	grants	a	
taxpayer	a	$1,000	credit	against	tax	for	every	qualifying	child	dependent.		The	credit	
phases	out	above	stated	modified	adjusted	gross	income	levels	and	accordingly	
applies	only	to	low	and	middle	income	families.78		Like	the	personal	exemption,	the	
child	credit	takes	family	size	into	account	to	determine	tax	liability.		A	married	
couple	with	two	children	and	income	of	$28,600		(the	sum	of	the	standard	
deduction	and	four	personal	exemptions)	would	have	a	refundable	$2,000	credit.	79		
The	credit	amount	and	its	income	level	limitations	have	no	automatic	
adjustment	for	inflation	and	the	real	value	of	the	dollar	amounts	thus	erodes	over	
time.		Congress	has	varied	the	amount	of	the	credit	from	$500	to	the	current	$1,000	
per	child.80		But	it	has	not	changed	the	income	levels	at	which	the	credit	phases	out.	
For	a	married	couple	filing	jointly,	the	credit	declines	as	modified	adjusted	gross	
income	exceeds	$110,000.		The	credit	phases	out	completely	at	$130,000.		The	
failure	to	adjust	this	“threshold	amount”	for	inflation	means	that	the	value	of	the	
credit	declines	in	real	terms	for	some	middle‐income	families.		
	
The	EIC	provides	a	refundable	credit	to	individuals	based	on	earnings.		The	
credit	consists	of	a	percentage	of	earned	income	up	to	a	dollar	limit.		As	earnings	
increase	further,	the	credit	levels	off	and	then	begins	to	phase	out.		A	taxpayer	
couple	with	two	children	who	had	earned	income	of	$28,600	(the	sum	of	the	
standard	deduction	and	the	personal	exemptions)	would	receive	a	refundable	credit	
of	$4,330.	Indeed,	the	credit	would	not	phase	out	completely	until	the	couple’s	
income	reached	$49,150.		But	as	income	increased	some	amount	of	the	credit	would	
be	used	to	offset	the	couple’s	tentative	tax	liability,	reducing	the	refundable	amount.		
	
	 The	Code	adjusts	for	inflation	all	the	dollar	elements	of	the	earned	income	
credit,	including	the	threshold	for	the	phaseout	percentage.		Assuming	the	earned	
income	increases	by	the	amount	of	inflation,	the	result	for	the	taxpayer	is	the	same	
real	income	under	an	inflation‐adjusted	tax	system.		For	a	couple	whose	earned	
income	does	not	increase	with	inflation,	the	structure	of	the	EIC	creates	varied	
results.		If	the	income	lies	below	the	earned	income	amount	in	the	EIC,	the	amount		
of	the	credit	will	remain	the	same	in	dollars,	but	will	lose	buying	power.		When	
income	equals	or	exceeds	the	earned	income	amount,	the	credit	will	remain	the	
same.		At	higher	income	levels,	of	tentative	tax	before	EITC	will	kick	in	at	later	points	
by	reason	of	the	increases	in	the	standard	deduction	and	the	personal	exemption,	
the	phaseout	of	EITC	will	start	later	and	the	taxpayer	will	receive	a	larger	credit.	
																																																								
76	IRC	§24.	
77	IRC	§32.	
78	The	threshold	amount	for	phasing	out	the	credit	consists	of	$110,000	for	a	
married	couple	filing	a	joint	return,	half	that	amount	for	separate	returns	and	
$75,000	for	individuals.	
79	If	the	couple	have	many	qualifying	children,	the	maximum	refundable	credit	is	
$3,000.		Rev.	Proc.	2013‐35,	2013‐2	C.B.	537.	
80	Economic	Growth	and	Tax	Relief	Reconciliation	Act	of	2001,	107	Pub.	L.	No.	16,	
§201(a),	115	Stat	38,	45.	
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At	lower	incomes,	inflation	adjustment	pushes	up	the	maximum	credit,	so	
that	the	unadjusted	income	would	get	more	dollars.		A	change	from	the	CPI‐u	to	c‐
CPI	would	reduce	the	adjustment	and	the	amount	of	the	dollars	at	most	income	
levels	eligible	for	the	EIC.	
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III	Effects	of	failing	to	adjust	for	inflation	
	 The	Code	states	the	value	of	certain	credit,	deduction	and	exclusion	
provisions	as	dollar	amounts,	but	provides	no	adjustment	for	inflation.		As	time	
passes,	these	amounts	lose	their	real	value	for	the	taxpayers	who	claim	them.	
Inflation	thus	operates	as	a	slow	repeal	of	the	benefit,	reducing	but	never	
completely	eliminating	it.		The	decline	in	the	benefit	has	the	reciprocal	effect	of	
increasing	real	tax	revenue.			
Slow	repeal	by	cumulative	inflation	has	the	political	virtue	of	stealth.		The	
benefit	to	the	disfavored	class	declines	without	public	announcement,	discussion	or	
vote.		No	political	actor	carries	the	burden	of	reducing	the	benefit.			Small	reductions	
caused	by	low	or	moderate	inflation	tend	to	escape	public	notice.		Only	in	periods	of	
unusually	high	inflation	do	taxpayers	voice	enough	concern	over	the	erosion	of	
particular	tax	benefits	to	move	their	representatives	to	act.81		Without	an	automatic	
inflation	adjustment,	the	proponents	of	a	tax	provision	bear	the	burden	of	justifying	
any	increase	in	the	dollar	amount	and	its	attendant	revenue	loss.		In	contrast,	the	
taxpayers	who	benefit	from	provisions	that	provide	for	automatic	adjustments	do	
not	have	to	explain	why	their	benefits	should	increase	every	year	to	match	the	rate	
of	inflation.	
	 	
																																																								
81	The	relatively	high	levels	of	inflation	in	the	mid	to	late	1970s	provides	an	example.		
See,	e.g.,	Indexation	of	Certain	Provisions	of	the	Tax	Laws:		Hearing	Before	the	Sen.	
Subcommittee	on	Tax,	Debt	Mgmn’t,	95th	Cong.	2d	Sess.	103	(1978)	(statement	of	
Dennis	Jacobe	on	behalf	of	the	U.S.	League	of	Savings	Associations).	
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	 Social	security	benefits	
	
	 Millions	of	taxpayers	receive	social	security	benefits.		The	Code	allows	them	
to	exclude	varying	amounts	of	the	benefits	from	gross	income,	but	does	not	index	
the	exclusion	levels	for	inflation.		
	
	 Before	1983,	administrative	practice	excluded	social	security	benefits	
entirely	from	gross	income,	treating	them	as	a	species	of	nontaxable	welfare	
benefits.82		As	part	of	a	larger	reform	of	the	social	security	system,	Congress	changed	
that	treatment.		In	reimagining	social	security	benefits	as	a	kind	of	income,	at	least	
two	characterizations	are	possible.			First,	many	understand	the	program	as	akin	to	
an	insurance	system,	as	its	formal	name,	the	Federal	Insurance	Contribution	Act,	
implies.	Workers	and	employers	make	payments	in	the	form	of	FICA	taxes	as	they	
earn	or	pay	wages.		Self‐employed	workers	pay	FICA	tax	on	their	self‐employment	
income.		Upon	retirement	or	disability,	beneficiaries	receive	benefit	payments.		Like	
beneficiaries	of	a	private	retirement	plan,	the	employee	participants	make	their	
payments	into	the	system	out	of	after‐tax	income.			When	a	retiree	receives	private	
benefit	payments,	part	consists	of	a	return	of	the	previously	taxed	amount,	not	
subject	to	a	second	tax,	while	the	excess	constitutes	income	subject	to	tax.83		
Similarly,	by	analogy	to	a	private	annuity,	social	security	benefits	could	be	
understood	as	in	part	a	return	of	the	amounts	previously	paid	in	and	only	in	part	as	
taxable	income.		An	alternative	view	of	the	social	security	system	severs	the	link	
between	payment	of	payroll	taxes	and	entitlement	to	retirement	or	disability	
benefits.		This	view	regards	the	two	flows	of	cash	as	separate	elements	within	a	
unitary	federal	budget.		The	system	creates	transfer	payments	from	today’s	workers	
to	retirees,	with	benefits	to	be	treated	for	income	tax	purposes	like	any	other	
income.		As	a	concession	to	the	fact	that	many	recipients	of	social	security	benefits	
have	little	or	no	other	income,	an	exclusion	of	some	amount	tied	to	income	level	
nevertheless	may	make	good	policy.84	
	
During	its	first	decades,	the	payroll	tax	that	financed	social	security	imposed	
a	relatively	low	rate	and	applied	to	a	limited	amount	of	earnings.85		Beginning	in	
1950	Congress	increased	individual	benefits	periodically	to	account	for	inflation.		
Congress	introduced	automatic	cost	of	living	adjustments	effective	in	1975.86		By	the	
end	of	the	1970s,	however,	social	security	benefits	were	projected	to	rapidly	
																																																								
82	IT	3447,	1941‐1	C.	B.	191.	
83	See	generally	I.R.C.	§	72,	which	specifies	the	tax	treatment	of	annuities.	
84	Any	exclusion	would	come	in	addition	to	the	standard	deduction	and	personal	
exemptions	otherwise	available.	
85	At	the	beginning,	the	tax	rate	was	1%,	applied	to	the	first	$3,000	of	earned	income.		
The	maximum	tax	was	$30.	
86Public	debt	limit;	disaster	losses;	Social	Security	Act,	Pub.L.	92‐336	§202,	86	Stat.	
406	(enacted	in	1972,	provided	for	automatic	cost	of	living	adjustments	beginning	
in	1975)	
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outstrip	funding.87		Many	individuals	received	benefits	far	in	excess	of	the	
annuitized	value	of	the	social	security	taxes	they	had	paid.		Concern	for	the	financial	
security	of	social	security	had	led	the	President	to	create	an	Advisory	Council	on	
Social	Security.88		As	part	of	its	mandate	the	Advisory	Council	considered	whether	
the	Code	should	tax	social	security	benefits	like	annuities.			Employment	taxes	paid	
would	constitute	the	beneficiary’s	contribution	and	the	benefits	in	excess	of	that	
amount	would	constitute	income,	spread	out	as	the	beneficiaries	received	the	
payments.	The	Council	rejected	the	full	annuity	approach	because	lack	of	the	
necessary	data	would	make	the	process	difficult	and	it	would	result	in	taxing	more	
of	the	benefit	“than	most	people	would	consider	appropriate.”		It	recommended	
instead	that	half	of	the	benefits	be	taxed.		Congress	followed	the	Council’s	report	
with	the	establishment	of	a	bipartisan	commission,	the	National	Commission	on	
Social	Security	Reform.89	This	Commission,	building	its	proposals	in	part	on	the	
recommendations	or	the	Advisory	Council,	adopted	the	half‐the‐benefits	approach	
in	principle,	but	inserted	an	income	floor,	below	which	no	benefits	would	be	taxed.		
It	also	specified	that	the	tax	collected	would	go	into	the	OASDI	trust	funds	rather	
than	into	general	revenues	in	order	to	help	shore	up	the	financial	stability	of		the	
trust	funds..		
	
Congress	enacted	most	of	the	Commission’s	social	security	reform	
recommendations.			As	to	the	income	taxation	of	benefits,	it	included	as	income	an	
amount	up	to	half	the	social	security	benefits,	if	modified	adjusted	gross	income	plus	
one	half	of	social	security	benefits	exceed	a	threshold	amount	($25,000	for	a	single	
individual,	$32,000	for	a	married	couple).90			It	also	directed	that	the	revenue	
generated	by	the	new	inclusion	flow	into	Social	Security’s	two	trust	funds,	Old	Age	
and	Survivors	Insurance	(OASI”)	and	Disability	Insurance	(“DI”),	rather	than	the	
Treasury’s	general	revenues.			
	
In	1993,	as	part	of	a	larger	deficit	reduction	plan,	Congress	added	a	second	
tier	to	the	taxation	of	social	security	benefits,	modeled	on	the	first.91		It	created	an	
inclusion	for	up	to	85%	of	social	security	benefits	if	modified	adjusted	gross	income	
plus	half	the	social	security	benefits	exceeds	the	second	tier	amount	($34,000	for	a	
single	individual	and	$44,000	for	a	joint	return).92		The	statute	credited	the	
proceeds	from	this	second	tier	of	tax	to	the	Medicare	Hospital	Insurance	program.	
																																																								
87	See	National	Pension	Policies:		Private	Pension	Plans:	Hearing	before	the	Subcomm.	
On	Retirement	Income	and	Employment,	of	the	House	Select	Comm.	On	Aging,	95th	
Cong.,	2d	Sess.	(1978)	
88	Executive	Order	No.	12335,	Dec.	16,	1981	46	Fed.	Reg.	61633.	
89	The	Commission	was	informally	known	as	the	Greenspan	Commission,	after	its	
Chair,	Alan	Greenspan.	
90	I.R.C.	section	86(c)(1).		Modified	adjusted	gross	income	makes	several	changes	to	
adjusted	gross	income,	most	significantly	adding	tax	exempt	interest.		I.R.C.	section	
86((b)(2).	
91	I.R.C.	section	86(c)(2).	
92	I.R.C.	section	86(a)(2).	
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The	Code	does	not	adjust	the	threshold	or	second‐tier	dollar	amounts	for	
inflation.		Nor	has	Congress	seen	fit	to	increase	either	the	threshold	amounts	or	the	
second	tier	amounts	in	order	to	take	account	of	inflation.		In	real	terms,	therefore,	
the	floors	in	the	section	have	dropped.		The	social	security	benefits	themselves,	
however,	continue	to	increase	with	inflation	as	required	by	statute.93		As	a	result,	
increasing	amounts	of	the	real	value	of	social	security	benefits	have	been	subjected	
to	income	taxation.			Only	8%	of	social	security	beneficiaries	paid	income	tax	in	1993	
with	respect	to	their	benefits.		By	2005,	39%	of	beneficiaries	(16.9	million	people)	
were	affected	by	the	income	taxation	of	social	security	benefits.94		In	2014	the	
proportion	had	increased	to	49%,	25.5	million	out	of	51.9	million	social	security	
beneficiaries.95		As	another	measure	of	the	magnitude	of	the	taxation	of	social	
security	benefits,	in	1984,	the	first	year	of	the	tax,	its	proceeds	accounted	for	1.67%	
of	receipts	for	the	social	security	funds.		In	2013	the	OASI	and	DI	trust	funds	were	
credited	with	$21.1	billion	from	taxation	of	benefits,	representing	2.5%	of	their	
income.		The	HI	fund	received	$14.3	billion	or	5.7%	of	its	total	income.96	
	
The	failure	to	adjust	the	threshold	amounts	for	inclusion	of	social	security	
benefits	in	gross	income	pushes	taxpayers	more	quickly	into	the	“transition	range”	
that	the	provision	establishes	to	phase	out	the	earlier	exclusions.			Like	many	
provisions	that	phase	out	favorable	tax	treatments,	the	transition	formulas	for	
including	50%	or	85%	of	social	security	benefits	in	income	increase	the	taxpayer’s	
marginal	tax	rate.		As	an	example,	suppose	a	married	couple	had	modified	adjusted	
gross	income	in	2014	of	$37,000	and	social	security	benefits	of	$14,000.		After	
inclusion	of	part	of	the	social	security	benefits,	and	subtraction	of	the	standard	
deduction	and	two	personal	exemptions,	their	income	tax	liability	amounts	to	
$2,655.		If	they	earn	an	additional	$1,000	of	income,	their	tax	increases	to	$2,932.50.		
Their	nominal	marginal	tax	rate	is	15%.		But	the	extra	$1,000	has	cost	them	$277.50	
in	additional	income	tax,	for	an	actual	marginal	rate	of	27.8%.		We	do	not	know	
what	specific	effects	this	may	have	on	conduct,	but	a	rational	actor	would	take	the	
higher	marginal	rate	into	account	in	deciding	whether	to	earn	the	additional	$1,000.	
	
At	least	some	of	the	architects	of	the	1983	social	security	reform	omitted	
indexation	of	the	social	security	income	tax	floors	with	the	express	intention	of	
reducing	the	floor’s	value.		Robert	J.	Myers,	former	Chief	Actuary	of	the	Social	
Security	Administration	and	Staff	Director	for	the	Commission,	testified	in	1993	that	
the	thresholds	were	not	indexed	in	1983	so	that	over	time	they	“would	gradually	
																																																								
93	42	U.S.C.	430.	
94	Christine	Scott	and	Janemarie	Mulvey,	Social	Security:		Calculation	and	History	of	
Taxing	Benefits,		Cong.	Rsch	Serv.	Report	(Aug.	2011).	
95	Noah	P.	Meyerson,	Social	Security:		Calculation	and	History	of	Taxing	Benefits,	Cong.	
Rsch.	Serv.	Report	(Jan.	2015).	
96	Id.	at	9.	
	 25
wither	on	the	vine.”97		Myers	viewed	the	limited	income	tax	exclusion	as	undesirable,	
and	agreed	to	include	it	only	as	a	political	necessity.		He	welcomed	the	erosion	of	the	
floor	amounts	in	real	value	terms	as	a	painless	way	to	repeal	them.		Myers	agreed	
with	the	principle	that	an	employee’s	benefits	reflecting	previously‐taxed	income	
should	not	be	subjected	to	tax,	but	calculated	that	the	previously	taxed	portion	
contributed	by	a	social	security	beneficiary	averaged	less	than	15%	of	the	benefits	
to	be	received.		Myers,	however,	foresaw	that	over	time,	as	the	burden	of	FICA	taxes	
increased	relative	to	benefits,	the	15%	estimate	would	understate	the	previously	
taxed	contribution.		He	argued	for	gradually	increasing	the	exclusion	percentage	
from	15%.		Congress	did	not	make	this	change.	
	The	shrinking	value	of	the	second‐level	threshold	amount	subjects	more	
beneficiaries	to	inclusion	of	85%	of	benefits.		Today	the	ratio	of	tax	payments	made	
by	a	worker	into	the	system	out	of	after‐tax	income	to	benefits	received	from	the	
system	is	higher	on	average	than	15%	and	thus	provides	a	justification	for	an	
enhanced	exclusion	of	benefits	from	current	income	tax.		To	bring	the	exclusion	
amount	in	line	with	the	previously	taxed	amount,	Congress	should	reduce	the	85%	
rate.	
	
Surprisingly,	the	gradual	increase	in	tax	of	social	security	benefits	has	
attracted	little	political	activity.		Perhaps	the	funding	mechanism	that	transfers	the	
tax	receipts	directly	to	the	social	security	and	Medicare	trust	funds	complicates	the	
prospect	for	inflation	relief	for	social	security	beneficiaries.		Any	increase	in	the	
floor	amounts	would	reduce	tax	receipts	currently	directed	to	the	trust	funds.		The	
reduction	would	weaken	the	trust	fund’s	financial	position	unless	some	other	
sources	made		up	the	missing	revenue.		
	
Dependent	care	services	
	
	 The	credit	for	dependent	care	services	provides	a	prime	illustration	of	the	
way	in	which	the	failure	to	index	dollar	amounts	reduces	benefits.		Code	section	21	
created	a	nonrefundable	credit	for	household	and	dependent	care	expenses	
necessary	for	gainful	employment.		The	credit	aims	primarily	at	relieving	working	
couples	or	single	parents	with	children	from	some	of	the	burden	of	day	care	
expenses.98		The	provision	has	a	long	history.			The	Board	of	Tax	Appeals	held	in	
1939	that	a	taxpayer	could	not	deduct	the	costs	of	child	care	as	ordinary	and	
necessary	expenses	of	carrying	on	a	trade	or	business.99		It	rejected	the	argument	
that	but	for	the	child	care	the	parents	would	have	been	unable	to	work	and	that	the	
expenses	accordingly	should	be	deductible.			
	
																																																								
97	Hearing	before	the	Committee	on	Finance,	US	Senate,	Taxation	of	Social	Security	
Benefits,	103d	Cong.	1st	Sess.,	May	4,	1993	(Statement	of	Robert	J.	Myers).	
98	It	also	applies	with	respect	to	a	spouse	or	dependent	incapable	of	caring	for	him	
or	herself.	
99	Henry	C.	Smith,	40	BTA	1038	(1939),	affd.	per	curiam,	113	F.2d	114	(2d	Cir.	1940).	
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Congress	created	a	separate	child	care	deduction	in	1954,	limited	to	the	most	
dire	of	circumstances.100		Congress	enlarged	the	scope	of	the	deduction	substantially	
in	1971101	and	converted	the	deduction	to	the	current	credit	in	1976.102			By	1971	
policy	analysts	and	legislators	had	recognized	that	the	limited	deductibility	of	child	
care	expenses	created	perverse	incentives	that	tended	to	discriminate	against	
women	joining	the	workforce.103		Wives	often	were	regarded	as	the	second	earners	
in	the	family.		In	making	the	decision	whether	to	move	into	the	market	economy,	
income	taxes	provided	a	significant	disincentive.		The	second	earner’s	earned	
income	would	be	added	to	that	of	their	spouse	and	taxed	in	a	joint	return	at	high	
marginal	rates,	starting	from	the	first	dollar	of	earnings.		Paying	child	care	costs	out	
of	after‐tax	income	often	left	little	net	increase	when	the	wife	joined	the	market	
economy.		By	comparison,	the	value	created	in	the	home	through	household	services	
was	not	subject	to	tax.		The	tax	rules	thus	created	disincentives	for	wives	to	enter	
the	market	economy.		The	deduction	and	then	the	credit	provided	a	compromise	
response.			
	
To	qualify	for	the	credit,	a	taxpayer	must	incur	expenses	that	enable	the	
individual	to	work	when	one	or	more	“qualifying	individuals”	share	the	taxpayer’s	
principal	place	of	abode.104		A	qualifying	individual	includes	a	dependent	aged	
twelve	years	or	less,	or	a	dependent	or	spouse	unable	to	care	for	him	or	her	self.105			
The	credit	consists	of	a	percentage	of	the	employment	related	expenses,	up	to	a	
maximum	of	$3,000	of	expenses	for	one	qualifying	individual	or	$6,000	for	two	or	
more	qualifying	individuals.106		The	percentage	ranges	from	35	percent,	declining	to	
20	percent	as	adjusted	gross	income	exceeds	$15,000.107		Employment	related	
expenses	include	expenses	for	household	services	and	for	care	of	a	qualifying	
individual.		Congress	increased	the	maximum	dollar	amounts	of	expenses	to	their	
current	levels	in	2001,	effective	in	2003,	but	did	not	include	an	inflation	
adjustment.108		As	a	consequence,	the	real	value	of	the	maximum	credit	has	declined	
since	2001;	the	$15,000	threshold	has	declined	in	value	to	$11,221	in	2001	dollars.			
																																																								
100	Internal	Revenue	Code	of	1954,	Pub.	L.	83‐591	§214,	68	Stat	730	(IRC	§214	(1954).	
101	Revenue	Act	of	1971,	Pub.	L.	92‐178	§210,	85	Stat	497,	518.	
102	Tax	Reform	Act	of	1976,	Pub.	L.	94‐455,	90	Stat	1520	(IRC	§21).	
103Alan	Feld,	Deductibility	of	Expenses	for	Child	Care	and	Household	Services:		New	
Section	214,	27	Tax	L.	Rev.	415	(1972);	Grace	Blumberg,	Sexism	in	the	Code:	A	
Comparative	Study	of	Income	Taxation	of	Working	Wives	and	Mothers,	21	Buffalo	L.	
Rev.	49‐98	(1971).	
	
104	I.R.C.	§21(b)(1).	
105	I.R.C.	§21(c).	
106	I.R.C.	§21(a)(2).	
107	I.R.C.	§21(b)(2).	
108Before	2001,	the	dollar	amounts	were	$2,400	and	$4,800.		The	adjustment	in	
2001	did	not	restore	the	dollar	amounts	to	their	real	value	in	1976.				
The	2001	Act	also	increased	the	maximum	percentage	credit	from	30%	to	35%.		The	
maximum	percentage	declines	to	20%	as	adjusted	gross	income	rises	from	a	
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The	maximum	expense	allotments	generally	fall	well	short	of	the	costs	
needed	to	provide	child	care	coverage	for	full‐time	employment.			At	the	
conservative	rate	of	$10	per	hour,	$3,000	buys	300	hours	of	coverage,	enough	for	
seven	and	one	half	weeks.109		At	the	20%	credit	rate,	the	amount	of	the	credit,	$600.		
pays	for	child	care	for	a	week	and	a	half.		The	modest	relief	provided	by	the	credit	
has	become	more	symbolic	than	real.			
	
It	is	not	clear	whether	failure	to	adjust	these	numbers	for	inflation	derives	
from	oversight	or	an	affirmative	desire	to	reduce	the	real	benefit	of	the	credit	over	
time.		As	some	evidence	of	Congressional	disfavor,	Section	129,	which	provides	an	
exclusion	from	income	for	employer‐provided	dependent	care	assistance,	contains	
different	dollar	limitations	but	also	does	not	adjust	for	inflation.110		A	third	provision,	
the	credit	for	employer	provided	child	care	facilities,	likewise	lacks	an	inflation	
adjustment.111	
	
The	absence	of	either	automatic	inflation	adjustments	or	more	regular	direct	
adjustment	of	the	numbers	has	produced	an	anomaly	in	section	21.		Virtually	no	one	
in	the	target	population	actually	can	use	the	stated	maximum	35%	rate	for	the	
credit.112	The	credit	is	nonrefundable,	so	it	can	benefit	the	taxpayer	only	by	
offsetting	income	tax	liability.		While	the	credit	nominally	applies	at	the	35%	rate	for	
AGI	of	$15,000	or	less,	it	can	have	effect	only	if	the	taxpayer	owes	some	tax.	But	in	
the	years	since	2003	when	the	AGI	cutoff	increased	from	$10,000	to	$15,000,	the	
standard	deduction	and	personal	exemption	amounts	have	increased	with	inflation	
adjustments.		A	single	working	parent	with	one	child	who	earns	$15,000	can	claim	a	
standard	deduction	in	2015	of	$9,250113	and	two	personal	exemptions	of	$4,000,	for	
a	total	of	$17,250.		At	$15,000	of	adjusted	gross	income	the	parent	thus	will	have	no	
taxable	income	and	no	tentative	tax.		The	parent	will	have	no	use	for	the	credit,	so	
that	the	nominal	35%	rate	is	meaningless	in	this	circumstance.		The	nontaxed	
portion	of	AGI	runs	even	higher	for	taxpayers	who	file	a	joint	return	or	parents	with	
more	children.	114			Only	in	the	unusual	case	of	a	parent,	married	but	filing	a	separate	
																																																																																																																																																																					
specified	dollar	amount.		The	2001	Act	increased	this	amount	from	$10,000	to	
$15,000.	Economic	Tax	and	Reconciliation	Act	of2001,	Pub.	L.	107=16,	§204,	115	
Stat.	38.	
109	Assumes	full‐time	forty	hour	per	week	employment.		At	part	time,	twenty	hour	
per	week	employment,	the	sum	covers	fifteen	weeks.	
110	The	maximum	exclusion	amount	is	$5,000,	$2,500	for	a	separate	return	filed	by	a	
married	individual.		I.R.C.	§129(a)(2)(A).	
111	I.R.C.	§45F.	
112	The	credit	consists	of	a	percentage	of	employment	related	expenses	calculated	
on	a	sliding	scale,	from	35%	to	20%.		The	percentage	declines	from	35%	by	one	
percentage	point	for	every	$2,000	(or	fraction)	by	which	adjusted	gross	income	
exceeds	$15,000.		I.R.C.	§21(a)(2).	
113	The	standard	deduction	amount	is	for	a	head	of	household.	
114		The	standard	deduction	amount	for	a	couple	filing	jointly	is	$12,600	,	which	
when	added	to	three	personal	exemptions,	totals		$24,600	.	
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return	and	claiming	a	dependent,	could	a	$15,000	adjusted	gross	income	produce	
even	a	small	amount	of	tentative	tax,	in	the	amount	of	$70.115.		The	difference	
between	a	35%	credit	and	a	20%	credit	shrinks	to	the	vanishing	point	when	applied	
to	a	small	amount	of	tentative	tax	of	a	tiny	segment	in	the	target	group.		No	stated	
reason	favors	this	group	over	other	low‐income	earners.		For	most	individuals	who	
claim	the	credit,	the	35%	rate	is	simply	illusory.	
	
		The	failure	to	adjust	for	inflation	has	thus	changed	the	value	of	the	child	and	
dependent	care	credit	in	two	ways.		It	has	reduced	the	effective	ceiling	on	the	
amount	of	employment‐related	expenses	taken	into	account	in	computing	the	credit	
and	therefore	the	value	of	the	maximum	credit.		It	has	distorted	the	sliding	
percentage	used	to	calculate	the	credit,	rendering	portions	of	its	range	effectively	
useless.		Congress	should	adjust	the		$3,000	and	$6,000	maximums	on	employment	
related	expenses	in	order	to	restore	the	value	lost	to	inflation	and	index	them	to	
prevent	future	erosion.		Congress	could	increase	the	$15,000	cutoff	point	to	correct	
for	inflation.		Further,	the	structure	of	the	credit	remains	unduly	complicated.		
Congress	could	eliminate	the	cumbersome	sliding	scale	credit	percentage	altogether	
and	substitute	a	flat	percentage.		It	could	increase	the	credit	percentage	slightly	to	
compensate	for	the	change.		These	changes	would	not	only	simplify	the	calculation	
of	the	credit,	but	would	render	the	credit	a	more	meaningful	aid	to	working	families	
	
President	Obama’s	2015	State	of	the	Union	message	proposed	a	major	
expansion	of	the	credit.		According	to	the	White	House	“Fact	Sheet”	the	proposal	
would	provide	a	50%	credit	with	respect	to	children	under	age	five,	increasing	the	
maximum	credit	amount	to	$3,000.116		The	phaseout	point		would	increase	to	
adjusted	gross	income	of	$120,000	.	
	 	
																																																								
115	.10	(15,000‐(6,300	+	8.000)).	
116	FACT	SHEET:		A	Simpler,	Fairer	Tax	Code	That	Responsibly	Invests	in	Middle	Class	
Families,	Office	of	Press	Secy	(Jan.	17,	2015),	available	at		
https://www.whitehouse.gov/th‐press‐ffice/2015/01/17/fact‐sheet‐simpler‐
fairer‐tax‐code‐responsibly‐invests‐middle‐class‐fami	
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Limitation	on	the	Use	of	Capital	Losses	
	
	 The	Code	generally	restricts	the	deduction	of	capital	losses	to	the	amount	of	
capital	gains	included	in	income.117		The	restriction	prevents	taxpayers	from	taking	
advantage	of	the	tax	law’s	realization	requirement	to	include	losses	but	not	gains.		
Since	the	Code	does	not	take	gains	and	losses	into	account	until	recognized,	a	
taxpayer	whose	investments	include	some	unrealized	gains	and	some	unrealized	
losses	might	seek	to	cull	the	portfolio,	sell	the	losing	investments	and	recognize	the	
losses	for	use	against	ordinary	income,	while	deferring	recognition	of	the	
investment	gains.		The	restriction	limits	the	ability	to	exploit	the	realization	
requirement	in	this	way.	
	 As	an	exception,	after	offsetting	recognized	capital	losses	against	recognized	
capital	gains,	the	Code	allows	an	individual	to	deduct	a	small	amount	of	capital	loss	
against	ordinary	income.118		The	Code	currently	limits	this	deduction	to	a	maximum	
of	$3,000.		Perhaps	the	exception	reflects	less	concern	that	the	owners	of	small	
portfolios	might	engage	in	tax‐motivated	selling	of	losing	investments.	Congress	has	
not	indexed	the	$3,000	limit	for	inflation	and	has	allowed	it	to	remain	the	same	
since	the	1976	Tax	Reform	Act	increased	it	from	$1,000,	effective	for	1978.119		The	
Committee	Report	then	had	cited	as	the	reason	for	the	change	the	reduced	value	of	
the	deduction	by	reason	of	the	increase	in	consumer	prices	since	1942	when	the	
$1,000	maximum	was	enacted	.	
	 Subsequent	inflation	has	failed	to	elicit	a	comparable	legislative	response.		
More	recent	proposals	to	increase	the	limit	have	met	with	rejection.		In	2002	the	
House	Ways	and	Means	Committee	voted	to	increase	the	limit	to	$20,000	and	to	
adjust	the	limit	going	forward	for	inflation.		The	House	did	not	act	on	the	proposal.			
To	maintain	the	real	value	of	the	1978	amount,	the	current	exclusion	should	be	
$10,893.		The	failure	either	to	increase	the	amount	or	to	index	it	for	inflation	may	
reflect	a	desire	to	phase	out	the	exception.					
Unlike	their	more	optimistic	cousins,	who	hope	for	large	gains	and	support	
lower	taxes	on	long‐term	capital	gains,	small	investors	have	not	rallied	to	increase	
the	deduction	for	capital	losses.		Taxpayers	may	carry	forward	their	unused	capital	
losses,	which	may	provide	some	consolation	for	bad	investments.		Even	in	periods	of	
stock	market	decline	little	political	pressure	has	arisen	for	change.		Accordingly,			
the	$3,000	maximum	remains	unadjusted.	
	
	
Residential	housing	
	
The	Internal	Revenue	Code	provides	generous	tax	support	for	owner‐
occupied	housing.		Here	we	will	consider	the	absence	of	inflation	adjustments	in	two	
																																																								
117	I.R.C.	§1211.	
118	IRC	section	1211(b).	
119	Tax	Reform	Act	of	1976,	Pub.	L.	94‐455	§1401(a),	90	Stat	1520.	
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expensive	provisions,	the	deduction	for	mortgage	interest	and	the	exclusion	of	
capital	gains	on	home	sales.120			
	
Although	the	Code	generally	does	not	allow	a	taxpayer	to	deduct	personal	
interest	expenses,	it	carves	out	an	important	exception	for	home	mortgage	interest.		
In	2013,	the	deduction	for	home	mortgage	interest	reduced	tax	revenues	by	an	
estimated	$70	billion.121		The	deduction	applies	to	qualified	residence	interest,	
defined	as	interest	paid	on	acquisition	indebtedness	on	a	qualified	residence	up	to	
$1	million	of	debt,	and	an	additional	$100,000	of	debt	secured	by	the	residence	even	
if	not	acquisition	debt.122		The	deduction	has	been	justified	as	an	incentive	to	
increase	home	ownership.		Critics	of	the	provision	challenge	both	the	premise,	that	
the	federal	government	should	subsidize	middle	and	upper	class	homeownership,	
and	the	means,	finding	the	interest	deduction	an	inefficient	and	poorly	designed	
subsidy.123			In	2012,	the	most	recent	year	for	which	statistics	are	available,	almost	
34.5	million	tax	returns	claimed	the	deduction	for	qualified	residence	interest.124		
Perhaps	because	so	many	deduction	itemizers	claim	it,	the	deduction	has	achieved	
the	political	status	of	a	“third	rail”,	a	provision	touched	at	great	peril.			
	
	 The	dollar	limits	on	the	amount	of	qualifying	indebtedness	cap	the	subsidy	
for	investment	in	extravagant	homes.		The	average	price	of	a	single	family	home	in	
the	United	States	was	$245,700		in	2013.125		Assuming	80%	financing	of	the	
																																																								
120	Homeowners	and	homeownership	also	receive	a	number	of	other	tax	benefits	
that	do	not	refer	to	specific	dollar	amounts	and	so	do	not	require	any	adjustment	for	
inflation.		The	benefits	(with	their	2013	estimated	costs)	include:	the	deduction	for	
state	and	local	property	taxes	on	owner‐occupied	homes	($20.3	billion);	the	
exclusion	of	net	imputed	rental	income	($74	billion);	and	the	exclusion	of	interest	
on	owner‐occupied	mortgage	subsidy	bonds	($1,170	billion).		The	Code	subsidizes	
rental	housing	construction	to	a	more	limited	extent,	e.g.	exclusion	of	interest	on	
rental	housing	bonds	($0.990	billion).	
121	CONG.	BUDG.	OFFICE,	The	Distribution	of	Major	Tax	Expentitures	in	the	Individual	
Income	Tax	System	6	(Table	1)	(2013).	
122	Acquisition	indebtedness	includes	debt	incurred	for	construction	and	substantial	
improvement	of	a	residence.		The	statute	extends	the	term	“qualified	residence”	to	
include	a	second	home.		I.R.C.	§163(h)(3).		The	residence	must	secure	the	loan.	
123	For	recent	discussions	see	Benjamin	Harris,	Eugene	Steuerle	and	Amanda	Eng,	
New	Perspectives	on	Homeownership	Incentives,	Tax	Notes	(12/2014)’	Reason 
Foundation, Unmasking the Mortgage Interest Deduction: Who Benefits 
and by How Much? (2011), Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars 
Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble:  How and Why the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction Failed, 17 Fordham J L & Fin L 751 (2012)	
124	I.R.S.,	Table	2.1	STAT.	INCOME	Pub.	1304	(2012)	Rev.	08‐2014.	
125	NAT’L	ASSOC.	REALTORS,	Sales	Price	of	Exsrting	Family	Homes	(Feb.	23,	2015).	
available	at	
http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/2015/embargoes/ehs‐02‐
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purchase	price,	the	statutory	limits	may	be	criticized	as	unduly	generous	in	their	
support	of	residential	housing	at	quadruple	the	average	price.		While	low	and	
moderate	income	individuals	may	need	some	tax	relief	to	aid	them	in	buying	and	
carrying	a	home,	many	of	these	taxpayers	claim	the	standard	deduction	and	get	no	
benefit	from	the	interest	deduction.		As	noted	earlier,	the	availability	of	the	standard	
deduction	means	that	the	net	benefit	of	the	interest	deduction	amounts	to	the	sum	
of	itemized	deductions	less	the	standard	deduction	multiplied	by	the	marginal	tax	
rate.		For	many	moderate	income	homeowners	the	net	benefit	is	quite	small.		At	the	
other	end	of	the	income	scale,	mortgage	amounts	in	the	seven	figures	strongly	imply	
that	the	purchasers	do	not	require	federal	assistance	in	housing	their	families.		The	
extension	of	the	tax	subsidy	to	its	current	levels	proceeds	more	from	political	rather	
than	humanitarian	justifications.		Mortgage	limits	at	their	current	level	benefit	
primarily	upper	middle	class	homeowners.		Further,	since	home	prices	vary	
significantly	by	region,	a	$1	million	mortgage	seems	less	extraordinary	in	New	York	
City	or	Hollywood,	where	political	clout	may	be	particularly	strong,	than	in	Omaha	
or	Texarkana.			
	
The	Code	does	not	adjust	the	limiting	numbers	for	inflation.		As	a	
consequence,	the	ceiling	numbers	lose	real	buying	power	on	a	gradual	but	
cumulative	basis.		The	value	of	the	$1	million	limit,	enacted	in	1986,	has	declined	
since	then	to	the	equivalent	of		$	462,963.				Inflation	acts	in	an	unobtrusive	way	to	
reduce	the	real	value	of	the	mortgage	ceiling	and	to	curb	the	more	extravagant	
aspects	of	the	interest	deduction.		
	
	
Homeowners	receive	an	added	tax	benefit	when	they	sell	a	home.		Upon	the	
sale	of	a	principal	residence	owned	and	occupied	for	a	stated	minimum	period,126	a	
single	individual	may	exclude	from	income	gain	up	to	$250,000;	a	husband	and	wife	
filing	a	joint	return	may	exclude	up	to	$500,000.		Any	excess	gain	incurs	tax	at	long	
term	capital	gain	rates.127		For	2013	the	exclusion	reduced	estimated	tax	revenue	by		
$18	billion.128		The	maximum	dollar	exclusions	are	unadjusted	for	inflation	and	the	
cap	on	benefits	conferred	by	the	provision	slowly	declines.	
The	current	exclusion	provision	enlarged	upon	and	replaced	two	earlier	
provisions.		One	provided	for	nonrecognition	of	gain	on	the	sale	of	a	principal	
residence	if	the	taxpayer	reinvested	an	amount	at	least	equal	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	
in	a	new	residence.		A	taxpayer	thus	could	move	to	successively	more	expensive	
homes	without	incurring	tax.		The	other	created	an	exclusion	for	older	homeowners’	
sales	of	their	homes.		The	policy	sought	to	mitigate	the	lock‐in	effect	for	their	
																																																																																																																																																																					
23/ehs‐01‐2015‐single‐family‐only‐2015‐02‐23.pdf	(for	existing	single	family	
homes)	
126	The	taxpayer	must	have	owned	and	used	the	property	as	the	principal	residence	
for	at	least	a	two‐years	out	of	the	preceding	five	years.		
127	A	homeowner	may	not	deduct	any	loss	on	sale	of	a	personal	residence,	Reg.	sec.	
1.165‐9(a).	
128		
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housing		An	elderly	couple	contemplating	sale	of	their	home	might	be	deterred	from	
selling	by	the	potentially		large	capital	gain,	while	instead	holding	the	property	until	
death	would	give	the	heirs	a	step‐up	in	basis	and	eliminate	any	tax	on	the	gain.			The	
current	provision	enlarged	the	exclusion	and	eliminated	the	“rollover”.	
	
Alimony	and	property	settlements	
	
	 The	Code	applies	different	tax	rules	to	three	elements	of	divorce	settlements.		
A	spouse	who	pays	alimony	as	defined	in	the	statute	can	deduct	that	amount	and	the	
recipient	spouse	includes	it	in	income.129		The	payor	of	child	support	payments	or	
property	settlements,	however,	cannot	deduct	them	and	the	recipient	does	not	
include	them	in	income.130		Congress	sought	to	limit	the	ability	of	divorcing	couples	
to	disguise	property	settlements	as	alimony	by	making	large	initial	payments	
labeled	as	alimony.		To	do	so,	the	Code	includes	“excess	alimony	payments”	in	the	
income	of	the	payor	spouse	in	the	third	year	after	the	separation	and	allows	a	
comparable	deduction	to	the	recipient	spouse.131		The	computation	formula	allows	a	
fixed	amount,	$15,000,	to	avoid	excess	alimony	treatment..		This	amount	has	
remained	unchanged	since	its	adoption	in	1986.		In	the	interim,	its	real	value	has	
declined	in	real	terms	to	$	6,944.		As	a	result,	the	recomputation	potentially	affects	
divorce	settlements	to	a	greater	extent	in	real	terms	than	originally	intended.				
	
Group	term	life	insurance	
	 The	Code	includes	in	the	income	of	an	employee	the	cost	of	group	term	life	
insurance	purchased	by	an	employer.132		It	excludes	the	cost	of	$50,000	of	the	
insurance.		The	amount	of	the	exclusion	has	not	changed	since	1964	when	the	
provision	entered	the	Code.133		The	real	value	of	the	insurance	benefit	covered	by	
the	exclusion	has	declined	by	87%.134		This	provision	may	confer	a	tax	benefit	that	
would	receive	little	support	if	proposed	today,	but	any	effort	to	repeal	the	provision	
likely	would	generate	political	opposition.		A	slow	repeal	by	inflation	serves	a	
similar	goal	without	fuss.	
	
Casualty	loss	deduction	
	 The	Code	allows	individuals	to	deduct	losses	from	fire,	storm,	shipwreck	or	
other	casualty	subject	to	two	limitations.135		One	limitation	reduces	the	deductible	
loss	from	a	casualty	by	$100.136		Originally	intended	to	prevent	claims	for	fender	
bender	accidents,	the	dollar	amount	has	remained	at	the	same	level,	except	for	a	
brief	period,	and	has	not	been	adjusted	for	inflation.		The	effect	of	the	$100	
																																																								
129	I.R.C.	§§	71(a)	and	215(a).	
130	I.R.C.	§71(c).	
131	I.R.C.		§71(f).	
132	I.R.C.	§79(a).	
133	Revenue	Act	of	1964,	Pub	L.	88‐272,	§204(a)(1),	78	Stat.	19.	
134	$50,000	in	2014	was	the	equivalent	of	$6,547	in	1964.	
135	I.R.C.	§165(c)(3)	and	(h).	
136	I.R.C.	§165(h)(1).	
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reduction	has	been	overshadowed	as	a	practical	matter	by	the	second	limitation,	
10%	of	the	taxpayer’s	adjusted	gross	income,	which	radically	reduces	the	number	of	
eligible	claims.137		The	$100	limitation	serves	little	purpose	and	Congress	should	
repeal	it.		In	the	interim,	its	value	slowly	declines	with	inflation.	
	
Administrative	provisions	
	 Inflation	can	affect	administrative	provisions	of	the	Code.		Often,	however,	
they	avoid	the	need	for	direct	adjustments.		As	an	example,	the	six‐year	statute	of	
limitations	for	a	substantial	omission	from	gross	income	applies	to	a	more	than	25%	
omission,	not	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount.138		Less	obviously,		the	requirement	to	file	an	
income	tax	return	applies	when	gross	income	equals	or	exceeds	the	personal	
exemption	plus	the	standard	deduction.139		Both	adjust	annually	for	inflation,	so	the	
filing	threshold	requires	no	further	adjustment.		Occasionally	an	administrative	
level	appears	as	a	fixed	dollar	amount.		The	rules	for	reporting	charitable	
contributions	provide	an	example.	
	 The	Code	ordinarily	accounts	for	property	transactions	by	looking	to	the	
adjusted	basis	of	the	property.140		The	charitable	contribution	deduction	provides	an	
important	exception.		It	measures	the	amount	of	a	contribution	by	its	fair	market	
value.141		Any	appreciation	over	adjusted	basis	goes	untaxed	but	increases	the	
amount	of	the	contribution	deduction.		While	many	gifts	of	property	can	be	readily	
valued	in	publicly‐traded	markets,	many	cannot.		To	prevent	overstatement	of	value	
Congress	has	enacted	a	series	of	stepped	requirements	for	taxpayers	to	describe	the	
property	in	filing	the	tax	return	or	obtain	a	formal	appraisal.	The	Code	defines	
thresholds	for	these	steps	in	fixed	dollar	amounts.		A	taxpayer	who	claims	a	
deduction	of	more	than	$500	for	a	gift	of	property	must	describe	the	nature	of	the	
property.142		With	certain	exceptions,	including	publicly	traded	securities,	for	a	
claimed	deduction	over	$5,000,	the	taxpayer	generally	must	obtain	a	qualified	
appraisal	and	report	the	results	on	the	tax	return.		For	a	claim	over	$500,000	the	
taxpayer	must	attach	the	appraisal	to	the	return.			Failure	to	comply	with	applicable	
requirements	can	result	in	denial	of	the	deduction.	These	amounts	are	not	adjusted	
for	inflation.		As	the	nominal	values	of	property	increase	over	time,	these	
administrative	provisions	will	apply	to	an	increasing	number	of	charitable	gifts.	
	
A	separate	provision	imposes	verification	requirements	on	contributions	of	
vehicles	with	a	claimed	value	in	excess	of	$500.		Another	provision	requires	a	
qualified	appraisal	for	a	single	gift	of	clothing	or	a	household	item	over	$500.		No	
inflation	adjustment	applies	to	any	of	these	dollar	amounts.		Over	time,	as	these	
dollar	amounts	lose	real	value,	we	would	anticipate	that	more	taxpayers	would	
become	subject	to	the	requirements.	
																																																								
137	I.R.C.	§165(h)(2).	
138	Section	6501(e).	
139	Section	6012(a)(1)(A).	
140	I.R.C.	§1011(a).	
141	Treas	Reg	§1.170A‐1(c)(1).	
142	I.R.C.	§170(f)(11)(A)	
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	 Individuals	who	use	their	cars	for	the	benefit	of	exempt	charities	may	deduct	
an	amount	based	on	mileage.		The	deduction	excludes	depreciation	but	does	account	
for	out‐of‐pocket	expenses	such	as	gasoline.		The	Code	currently	fixes	the	applicable	
rate	at	14	cents	per	mile.143		No	inflation	adjustment	applies.	
	
	 No	policy	comes	to	mind	to	justify	the	slow	decline	indollar	boundaries	that	
govern	verification	for	charitable	gifts	in	kind.		Inflation	adjustments	seem	as	
appropriate	for	these	administrative	limitations	as	for	more	substantive	rules.		Nor	
should	the	14‐cent	rule	remain	at	the	same	level	in	the	face	of	rising	out‐of‐pocket	
costs.	
	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								
143	I.R.C.	§170(i).	
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Conclusion	
	 Taxation	invariably	involves	a	political	process	to	determine	who	pays	and	
how	much.		Even	an	apparently	technical	a	matter,	adjusting	for	inflation,	becomes	
an	arena	in	which	one	group	or	another	may	seek	advantage.		The	indexing	rules	
currently	built	into	the	tax	law	reflect	this	process.	
	
	 The	provisions	for	automatic	inflation	adjustments	in	the	income	tax	raise	a	
number	of	issues.		First,	the	choice	of	the	proper	measure	of	inflation	for	this	
purpose	has	been	called	into	question.		The	chained	CPI	has	gained	acceptance	by	
scholars	in	the	field	as		a	more	accurate	measure	of	consumer	inflation	than	the	CPI‐
u.		Continued	use	of	the	CPI‐u	to	make	tax	adjustments	raises		the	prospect	that	it	
overshoots	the	mark	and	provides	hidden	tax	cuts	as	measured	in	real	value	terms	
for	some	taxpayers.		Second,	the	application	of	widespread	indexation	effectively	
limits	the	political	choices	open	to	legislators.		Without	indexation,	income	taxes	
slowly	creep	up	and	the	legislature	more	easily	can	provide	selective	relief	through	
tax	reductions.		Readjustments	become	more	difficult	when	inflation	adjustment	
occurs	automatically.		On	the	other	hand,	some	observers	support	automatic	
adjustments	precisely	because	the	system	limits	Congressional	discretion	to	give	
selective	relief.		Third,	the	application	of	indexing	to	dollar	amounts	does	not	occur	
uniformly	for	all	tax	provisions.		The	failure	to	index	all	dollar	amounts	in	the	Code	
subjects	some	provisions	to	gradual	reduction	in	real	value	without	the	political	cost	
that	an	effort	to	repeal	the	provision	would	incur.		In	effect,	it	shifts	the	burden	of	
action	from	those	who	would	reduce	or	eliminate	the	provision	to	those	who	would	
preserve	it.		Perhaps	in	the	future,	foes	of	new	or	renewed	deductions	or	credits	
involving	dollar	amounts,	unable	to	defeat	the	proposed	benefit,	may	learn	to	use	
inflation	as	a	functional	limitation.	
	
	
